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Abstract
In the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behaviors have been quite effective. We
aim to expand the scope of those methods and tools. We focus on proving equivalences P ≈ Q in which P and Q are two processes
that differ only in the choice of some terms. These equivalences arise often in applications. We show how to treat them as predicates
on the behaviors of a process that represents P and Q at the same time. We develop our techniques in the context of the applied pi
calculus and implement them in the tool ProVerif.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many security properties can be expressed as predicates on system behaviors. These properties include some
kinds of secrecy properties (for instance, “the system never broadcasts the key k”). They also include correspondence
properties (for instance, “if the system deletes file f , then the administrator must have requested it”). Such predicates
on system behaviors are the focus of many successful methods for security analysis. In recent years, several tools have
made it possible to prove many such predicates automatically or semi-automatically, even for infinite-state systems
(e.g., [15,40,43]).
Our goal in this work is to expand the scope of those methods and tools. We aim to apply them to important security
properties that have been hard to prove and that cannot be easily phrased as predicates on system behaviors. Many
such properties can be written as equivalences. For instance, the secrecy of a boolean parameter x of a protocol P(x)
may be written as the equivalence P(true) ≈ P(false). Similarly, as is common in theoretical cryptography, we may
wish to express the correctness of a construction P by comparing it to an ideal functionality Q, writing P ≈ Q. Here
the relation ≈ represents observational equivalence: P ≈ Q means that no context (that is, no attacker) can distinguish
P and Q. A priori, P ≈ Q is not a simple predicate on the behaviors of P or Q.
 A preliminary version of this work was presented at the 20th IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2005) [20].
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We focus on proving equivalences P ≈ Q in which P and Q are two variants of the same process obtained by
selecting different terms on the left and on the right. In particular, P(true) ≈ P(false) is such an equivalence, since
P(true) and P(false) differ only in the choice of value for the parameter x. Both P(true) and P(false) are variants
of a process that we may write P(diff[true, false]); the two variants are obtained by giving different interpretations to
diff[true, false], making it select either true or false.
Although the notation diff can be viewed as a simple informal abbreviation, we find that there is some value
in giving it a formal status. We define a calculus that supports diff. With a careful definition of the operational
semantics of this calculus, we can establish the equivalence P(true) ≈ P(false) by reasoning about behaviors of
P(diff[true, false]).
In this operational semantics, P(diff[true, false]) behaves like both P(true) and P(false) from the point of view of
the attacker, as long as the attacker cannot distinguish P(true) and P(false). The semantics requires that the results
of reducing P(true) and P(false) can be written as a process with subexpressions of the form diff[M1,M2]. On the
other hand, when P(true) and P(false) would do something that may differentiate them, the semantics specifies
that the execution of P(diff[true, false]) gets stuck. Hence, if no behavior of P(diff[true, false]) ever gets stuck, then
P(true) ≈ P(false). Thus, we can prove equivalences by reasoning about behaviors, though not the behaviors of the
original processes in isolation.
This technique applies not only to an equivalence P(true) ≈ P(false) that represents the concealment of a boolean
parameter, but to a much broader class of equivalences that arise in security analysis and that go beyond secrecy
properties. In principle, every equivalence could be rewritten as an equivalence in our class: we might try to prove
P ≈ Q by examining the behaviors of
if diff[true, false] = true then P else Q
This observation suggests that we should not expect completeness for an automatic technique. Indeed, the class of
equivalences that we can establish automatically does not include some traditional bisimilarities. Accordingly, we
aim to complement, not to replace, other proof methods. Moreover, we are primarily concerned with soundness and
usefulness, and (in contrast with some related work [7,23,24,25,29,38]) we emphasize simplicity and automation over
generality. We believe, however, that the use of diff is not “just a hack”, because diff is amenable to a rigorous treatment
and because operators much like diff have already proved useful in other contexts—in particular, in elegant soundness
proofs of information-flow type systems [44,45]. Baudet’s recent thesis includes a further study of diff and obtains a
decidability result for processes without replication [12].
We implement our technique in the tool ProVerif [15]. This tool is a protocol analyzer for protocols written in
the applied pi calculus [6], an extension of the pi calculus with function symbols that may represent cryptographic
operations. Internally, ProVerif translates protocols to Horn clauses in classical logic, and uses resolution on these
clauses. The mapping to classical logic (rather than linear logic) embodies a safe abstraction which ignores the number
of repetitions of each action, and which is key to the treatment of infinite-state systems [19]. We extend the translation
into Horn clauses and also the manipulation of these Horn clauses.
While the implementation in ProVerif requires a non-trivial development of theory and code, it is rather fruitful.
It enables us to treat, automatically, interesting proofs of equivalences. In particular, as in previous ProVerif proofs,
it does not require that all systems under consideration be finite-state. We demonstrate these points through small
examples and larger applications.
Specifically, we apply our technique to an infinite-state analysis of the important Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE)
protocol [13,14]. (Password-based protocols such as EKE have attracted much attention in recent years, partly because
of the difficulty of reasoning about them.) We also use our technique for checking certain equivalences that express
authenticity properties in an example from the literature [8]. In other applications, automated proofs of equivalences
serve as lemmas for manual proofs of other results. We illustrate this combination by revisiting proofs for the JFK
protocol [9].
One of the main features of the approach presented in this paper is that it is compatible with the inclusion of equational
theories on function symbols. We devote considerable attention to their proper, sound integration. Those equational
theories serve in modelling properties of the underlying cryptographic operations; they are virtually necessary in many
applications. For instance, an equational theory may describe a decryption function that returns “junk” when its input
is not a ciphertext under the expected key. Without equational theories, we may be able to model decryption only as a
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destructor that fails when there is a mismatch between ciphertext and key. Because the failure of decryption would be
observable, it can result in false indications of attacks. Our approach overcomes this problem.
In contrast, a previous method for proving equivalences with ProVerif [17] does not address equivalences that
depend on equational theories. Moreover, that method applies only to pairs of processes in which the terms that differ
are global constants, not arbitrary terms. In these respects, the approach presented in this paper constitutes a clear
advance. It enables significant proofs that were previously beyond the reach of automated techniques.
ProVerif belongs in a substantial body of work on sound, useful, but incomplete methods for protocol analysis. These
methods rely on a variety of techniques from the programming-language literature, such as type systems, control-flow
analyses, and abstract interpretation (e.g., [1,22,37,42]). The methods are of similar power for proving predicates on
behaviors [3,21]. On the other hand, they typically do not target proofs of equivalences, or treat only specific classes
of equivalences for particular equational theories.
The next section describes the process calculus that serves as setting for this work. Section 3 defines and studies
observational equivalence. Section 4 contains some examples. Section 5 deals with equational theories. Section 6
explains how ProVerif maps protocols with diff to Horn clauses. Section 7 is concerned with proof techniques for
those Horn clauses. Section 8 introduces a simple construct for breaking protocols into stages, as a convenience for
applications. Section 9 describes applications. Section 10 mentions other related work and concludes. The Appendix
contains proofs. The proof scripts for all examples and applications of this paper, as well as the tool ProVerif, are
available at http://www.di.ens.fr/∼blanchet/obsequi/.
2. The process calculus
This section introduces our process calculus, by giving its syntax and its operational semantics. This calculus is
a combination of the original applied pi calculus [6] with one of its dialects [17]. This choice of calculus gives us
the richness of the original applied pi calculus (in particular with regard to equational theories) while enabling us to
leverage ProVerif.
2.1. Syntax and informal semantics
Fig. 1 summarizes the syntax of our calculus. It defines a category of terms (data) and processes (programs).
It assumes an infinite set of names and an infinite set of variables; a, b, c, k, s, and similar identifiers range over
names, and x, y, and z range over variables. It also assumes a signature  (a set of function symbols, with arities and
with associated definitions as explained below). We distinguish two categories of function symbols: constructors and
M,N ::= terms
x, y, z variable
a, b, c, k, s name
f (M1, . . . ,Mn) constructor application
D ::= term evaluations
M term
eval h(D1, . . . , Dn) function evaluation
P,Q,R ::= processes
M(x).P input
M〈N〉.P output
0 nil
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
(νa)P restriction
let x = D in P else Q term evaluation
Fig. 1. Syntax for terms and processes.
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destructors. We often write f for a constructor, g for a destructor, and h for a constructor or a destructor. Constructors
are used for building terms. Thus, the terms M,N, . . . are variables, names, and constructor applications of the form
f (M1, . . . ,Mn).
As in the applied pi calculus [6], terms are subject to an equational theory. Identifying an equational theory with
its signature , we write   M = N for an equality modulo the equational theory, and   M /= N an inequality
modulo the equational theory. (We write M = N and M /= N for syntactic equality and inequality, respectively.) The
equational theory is defined by a finite set of equations   Mi = Ni , where Mi and Ni are terms that contain only
constructors and variables. The equational theory is then obtained from this set of equations by reflexive, symmetric,
and transitive closure, closure by substitution (for any substitution σ , if  M = N then  σM = σN ), and closure
by context application (if   M = N then   M ′{M/x} = M ′{N/x}, where {M/x} is the substitution that replaces
x with M). We assume that there exist M and N such that   M /= N .
As previously implemented in ProVerif, destructors are partial, non-deterministic operations on terms that processes
can apply. More precisely, the semantics of a destructor g of arity n is given by a finite set def(g) of rewrite rules
g(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) → M ′, where M ′1, . . . ,M ′n,M ′ are terms that contain only constructors and variables, the variables
of M ′ are bound in M ′1, . . . ,M ′n, and variables are subject to renaming. Then g(M1, . . . ,Mn) is defined if and only
if there exists a substitution σ and a rewrite rule g(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) → M ′ in def(g) such that Mi = σM ′i for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and in this case g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → σM ′. In order to avoid distinguishing constructors and destructors
in the definition of term evaluation, we let def(f ) be {f (x1, . . . , xn) → f (x1, . . . , xn)} when f is a constructor of
arity n.
The process let x = D in P else Q tries to evaluate D; if this succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is
executed, else Q is executed. Here the reader may ignore the prefix eval which may occur in D, since eval f and f
have the same semantics when f is a constructor, and destructors are used only with eval. In Section 5, we distinguish
eval f and f in order to indicate when terms are evaluated.
Using constructors, destructors, and equations, we can model various data structures (tuples, lists, . . . ) and cryp-
tographic primitives (shared-key encryption, public-key encryption, signatures, . . . ). Typically, destructors represent
primitives that can visibly succeed or fail, while equations apply to primitives that always succeed but may sometimes
return “junk”. For instance, suppose that one can detect whether shared-key decryption succeeds or fails; then we
would use a constructor enc, a destructor dec, and the rewrite rule dec(enc(x, y), y) → x. Otherwise, we would use
two constructors enc and dec, and the equations dec(enc(x, y), y) = x and enc(dec(x, y), y) = x. The second equation
prevents that the equality test enc(dec(M,N),N) = M reveal that M must be a ciphertext under N . (The first equation
is standard; the second is not, but it holds for block ciphers.) We refer to previous work [6,17] for additional explanations
and examples.
The rest of the syntax of Fig. 1 is fairly standard pi calculus. The input process M(x).P inputs a message on channel
M , and executes P with x bound to the input message. The output process M〈N〉.P outputs the message N on channel
M and then executes P . (We allow M to be an arbitrary term; we could require that M be a name, as is frequently done,
and adapt other definitions accordingly.) The nil process 0 does nothing and is sometimes omitted in examples. The
process P | Q is the parallel composition of P and Q. The replication !P represents an unbounded number of copies
of P in parallel. The restriction (νa)P creates a new name a, and then executes P . The syntax does not include the
conditional if M = N then P else Q, which can be defined as let x = equals(M,N) in P else Q where x is a fresh
variable and equals is a binary destructor with the rewrite rule equals(x, x) → x. We always include this destructor
in .
We write fn(P ) and fv(P ) for the sets of names and variables free in P , respectively, which are defined as usual. A
process is closed if it has no free variables; it may have free names. We identify processes up to renaming of bound
names and variables. An evaluation context C is a closed context built from [ ], C | P , P | C, and (νa)C.
2.2. Formal semantics
The rules of Fig. 2 axiomatize the reduction relation for processes (→), thus defining the operational semantics
of our calculus. Auxiliary rules define term evaluation (⇓) and the structural congruence relation (≡); this relation
is useful for transforming processes so that the reduction rules can be applied. Both ≡ and → are defined only on
closed processes. We write →∗ for the reflexive and transitive closure of → , and →∗≡ for its union with ≡. When
 is clear from the context, we abbreviate → and ⇓ to → and ⇓, respectively.
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M ⇓M
eval h(D1, . . . , Dn)⇓ σN
if h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N ∈ def(h),
and σ is such that for all i, Di ⇓Mi and   Mi = σNi
P | 0 ≡ P
P | Q ≡ Q | P
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R)
(νa)(νb)P ≡ (νb)(νa)P
(νa)(P | Q) ≡ P | (νa)Q
if a /∈ fn(P )
P ≡ P
Q ≡ P ⇒ P ≡ Q
P ≡ Q, Q ≡ R ⇒ P ≡ R
P ≡ Q ⇒ P | R ≡ Q | R
P ≡ Q ⇒ (νa)P ≡ (νa)Q
N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).P → Q | P {M/x}
if   N = N ′ (Red I/O)
let x = D in P else Q → P {M/x}
if D ⇓M (Red Fun 1)
let x = D in P else Q → Q
if there is no M such that D ⇓M (Red Fun 2)
!P → P | !P (Red Repl)
P → Q ⇒ P | R → Q | R (Red Par)
P → Q ⇒ (νa)P → (νa)Q (Red Res)
P ′ ≡ P, P → Q, Q ≡ Q′ ⇒ P ′ → Q′ (Red ≡)
Fig. 2. Semantics for terms and processes.
This semantics differs in minor ways from the semantics of the applied pi calculus [6]. In particular, we do not
substitute equals for equals in structural congruence, but only in a controlled way in certain rules. Thus, the rule for I/O
does not require a priori that the input and output channels be equal: it explicitly uses the equational theory to compare
them. We also use a reduction rule (Red Repl) for modelling replication, instead of the more standard, but essentially
equivalent, structural congruence rule. This weakening of structural congruence in favor of the reduction relation is
designed to simplify our proofs.
3. Observational equivalence
In this section we introduce diff formally and establish a sufficient condition for observational equivalence. We first
recall the standard definition of observational equivalence from the pi calculus:
Definition 1. The process P emits on M (P ↓M ) if and only if P ≡ C[M ′〈N〉.R] for some evaluation context C that
does not bind fn(M) and   M = M ′.
(Strong) observational equivalence ∼ is the largest symmetric relation R on closed processes such that P R Q
implies
1. if P ↓M then Q↓M ;
2. if P → P ′ then Q → Q′ and P ′ R Q′ for some Q′;
3. C[P ] R C[Q] for all evaluation contexts C.
Weak observational equivalence ≈ is defined similarly, with →∗ ↓M instead of ↓M and →∗ instead of →.
Intuitively, a context may represent an adversary, and two processes are observationally equivalent when no adversary
can distinguish them.
Next we introduce a new calculus that can represent pairs of processes that have the same structure and differ only
by the terms and term evaluations that they contain. We call such a pair of processes a biprocess. The grammar for
the calculus is a simple extension of the grammar of Fig. 1, with additional cases so that diff[M,M ′] is a term and
diff[D,D′] is a term evaluation. We also extend the definition of contexts to permit the use of diff, and sometimes refer
to contexts without diff as plain contexts.
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Fig. 3. Generalized rules for biprocesses.
Given a biprocess P , we define two processes fst(P ) and snd(P ), as follows: fst(P ) is obtained by replacing
all occurrences of diff[M,M ′] with M and diff[D,D′] with D in P , and similarly, snd(P ) is obtained by replacing
diff[M,M ′] with M ′ and diff[D,D′] with D′ in P . We define fst(D), fst(M), snd(D), and snd(M) similarly. Our goal
is to show that the processes fst(P ) and snd(P ) are observationally equivalent:
Definition 2. Let P be a closed biprocess. We say that P satisfies observational equivalence when fst(P ) ∼ snd(P ).
The semantics for biprocesses is defined as in Fig. 2 with generalized rules (Red I/O), (Red Fun 1), and (Red Fun 2)
given in Fig. 3. Reductions for biprocesses bundle those for processes: if P → Q then fst(P ) → fst(Q) and snd(P ) →
snd(Q). Conversely, however, reductions in fst(P ) and snd(P ) need not correspond to any biprocess reduction, in par-
ticular when they do not match up. Our first theorem shows that the processes are equivalent when this does not happen.
Definition 3. We say that the biprocess P is uniform when fst(P ) → Q1 implies that P → Q for some biprocess Q
with fst(Q) ≡ Q1, and symmetrically for snd(P ) → Q2.
Theorem 1. Let P0 be a closed biprocess. If, for all plain evaluation contexts C and reductions C[P0] →∗ P , the
biprocess P is uniform, then P0 satisfies observational equivalence.
Proof. Let P be a closed biprocess such that C[P ] →∗≡ Q always yields a uniform biprocess Q, and consider the
relation
R = {(fst(Q), snd(Q)) | C[P ] →∗≡ Q}
In particular, we have fst(P ) R snd(P ), so we can show that P satisfies observational equivalence by establishing
that the relation R′ = R ∪R−1 meets the three conditions of Definition 1. By symmetry, we focus on R. Assume
fst(Q) R snd(Q).
1. Assume fst(Q) ↓M , and let TM = M(x).c〈c〉 for some fresh name c. As usual in the pi calculus, the predicate
_ ↓M tests the ability to send any message on M , hence for any plain process Qi , we have Qi ↓M if and only if
Qi | TM → Ri | c〈c〉 for some Ri .
Here, we have fst(Q) | TM → R1 | c〈c〉 for some R1. The reductions C[P ] →∗≡ Q imply C[P ] | TM →∗≡ Q |
TM . By hypothesis (with the context C[_] | TM ), Q | TM is uniform, hence Q | TM → Q′ for some Q′ with
fst(Q′) ≡ R1 | c〈c〉. Since c does not occur anywhere inQ, by case analysis on this reduction step with our semantics
for biprocesses we obtain Q′ ≡ R | c〈c〉 for some biprocess R. Thus, we obtain snd(Q) | TM → snd(R) | c〈c〉,
and finally snd(Q) ↓M .
2. If fst(Q) → Q′1 then, by uniformity, we have Q → Q′ with fst(Q′) = Q′1. Thus, C[P ] →∗≡→ Q′ and, by defi-
nition of R, we obtain fst(Q′) R snd(Q′). Finally, by definition of the semantics of biprocesses, Q → Q′ implies
snd(Q) → snd(Q′).
3. Let C′ be a plain evaluation context. By definition of the semantics of biprocesses, C[P ] →∗≡ Q always implies
C′[C[P ]] →∗≡ C′[Q], hence C′[fst(Q)] = fst(C′[Q]) R snd(C′[Q]) = C′[snd(Q)]. 
Our plan is to establish the hypothesis of Theorem 1 by automatically verifying that all the biprocesses P in
question meet conditions that imply uniformity. The next corollary details those conditions, which guarantee that a
communication and an evaluation, respectively, succeed in fst(P ) if and only if they succeed in snd(P ):
Corollary 1. LetP0 be a closed biprocess. Suppose that, for all plain evaluation contextsC, all evaluation contextsC′,
and all reductions C[P0] →∗ P,
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1. if P ≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R], then   fst(N) = fst(N ′) if and only if   snd(N) = snd(N ′),
2. if P ≡ C′[let x = D in Q else R], then there exists M1 such that fst(D)⇓M1 if and only if there exists M2 such
that snd(D)⇓M2.
Then P0 satisfies observational equivalence.
Proof. We show that P is uniform, then we conclude by Theorem 1. Let us show that, if fst(P ) → P ′1 then there
exists a biprocess P ′ such that P → P ′ and fst(P ′) ≡ P ′1. The case for snd(P ) → P ′2 is symmetric.
By induction on the derivation of fst(P ) → P ′1, we first show that there exist C, Q, and Q′1 such that P ≡ C[Q],
P ′1 ≡ fst(C)[Q′1], and fst(Q) → Q′1 using one of the four process rules (Red I/O), (Red Fun 1), (Red Fun 2), or
(Red Repl): every step in this derivation trivially commutes with fst, except for structural steps that involve a parallel
composition and a restriction, in case a ∈ fn(P ) but a /∈ fn(fst(P )). In that case, we use a preliminary renaming from
a to some fresh a′ /∈ fn(P ).
For each of these four rules, relying on a hypothesis of Corollary 1, we find Q′ such that fst(Q′) = Q′1 and Q → Q′
using the corresponding biprocess rule:
(Red I/O): We have Q = N〈M〉.R | N ′(x).R′ with   fst(N) = fst(N ′) and Q′1 = fst(R) | fst(R′){fst(M)/x}. For
Q′ = R | R′{M/x}, we have fst(Q′) = Q′1 and, by hypothesis 1,   snd(N) = snd(N ′), hence Q → Q′.
(Red Fun 1): We have Q = let x = D in R else R′ with fst(D)⇓M1 and Q′1 = fst(R){M1/x}. By hypothesis 2,
snd(D)⇓M2 for some M2. We take Q′ = R{diff[M1,M2]}, so that fst(Q′) = Q′1 and Q → Q′.
(Red Fun 2): We haveQ = let x = D inR elseR′ with noM1 such that fst(D)⇓M1 andQ′1 = fst(R′). By hypothesis 2,
there is no M2 such that snd(D)⇓M2. We obtain Q → Q′ for Q′ = R′.
(Red Repl): We have Q = !R and Q′1 = fst(R) | !fst(R). We take Q′ = R | !R, so that fst(Q′) = Q′1 and Q → Q′.
To conclude, we take the biprocess P ′ = C[Q′] and the reduction P → P ′. 
Thus, we have a sufficient condition for observational equivalence of biprocesses. This condition is essentially a
reachability condition on biprocesses. Starting in Section 5, we adapt existing techniques for reasoning about processes
in order to prove this condition. The condition is however not necessary: as suggested in the introduction, if P ∼ Q,
then if diff[true, false] = true then P else Q satisfies observational equivalence, but Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 will
not enable us to prove this fact.
4. Examples in the applied pi calculus
This section illustrates our approach by revisiting examples of observational equivalences presented with the applied
pi calculus [6]. Interestingly, all those equivalences can be formulated using biprocesses, proved via Theorem 1 and,
it turns out, verified automatically by ProVerif. Section 9 presents more complex examples.
We begin with equivalences that can be expressed with biprocesses that perform a single output, of the form
(νa1, . . . , ak)c〈M〉 where c is a name that does not occur in a1, . . . , ak or in M . Intuitively, such equivalences state that
no environment can differentiate fst(M) from snd(M) without knowing some name in a1, . . . , ak . Such equivalences
on terms under restrictions are called static equivalences [6]. They arise when one considers attackers that first intercept
a series of messages, then attempt to differentiate two configurations of the protocol by computing on those messages
without interacting with the protocol further. Here, the term M may be a tuple diff[M1,M ′1], . . . , diff[Mn,M ′n] that
collects all pairs of intercepted messages, and a1 , . . . , ak may be names that represent all local secrets and fresh values
used by the protocol.
Static equivalences play a central role in the extension of proof techniques from the pure pi calculus to the applied
pi calculus. In particular, observational equivalence in the applied pi calculus can be reduced to standard pi calculus
requirements plus static equivalences [6]. In other words, proofs of observational equivalences can be decomposed into
lemmas that deal with terms and general arguments that relate processes with different structures; the former depend
on the signature, while the latter come from the pure pi calculus. In our experience, a large fraction of the proof effort
is typically devoted to those lemmas on terms, and Theorem 1 is a good tool for establishing them.
Example 1. Consider a cryptographic hash function, modelled as a constructorhwith neither rewrite rule nor equation.
The environment should not be able to distinguish a freshly generated random value, modelled as a fresh name a,
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from its hash h(a) [6, Section 4.2]. Formally, using the automated technique presented in this paper, we verify that
the biprocess (νa)c〈diff[a, h(a)]〉 satisfies equivalence. On the other hand, P = (νa, a′)c〈(a, diff[a′, h(a)])〉 does not
satisfy equivalence: although both processes emit a pair of fresh terms, the environment can distinguish one process
from the other by computing a hash of the first element of the pair and comparing it to the second element of the pair,
using the context
C[_] = c(x, y).if y = h(x) then d〈c〉 else 0 | [_]
With our biprocess semantics, C[P ] performs a (Red I/0) step then gets stuck on the test (νa, a′)
if diff[a′, h(a)] = h(a) then d〈c〉 else 0.
Example 2. Diffie-Hellman computations used in key agreement protocols can be expressed in terms of a constant b,
a binary constructor ^, and the equation (b^x)^y = (b^y)^x [4,6]. With this signature, we verify that
(νa1, a2, a3)c〈(b^a1, b^a2, diff[(b^a1)^a2, b^a3])〉
satisfies equivalence. This equivalence closely corresponds to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption often made
by cryptographers; it is also the main lemma in the proof of [6, Theorem 3]. Intuitively, even if the environment is
given access to the exponentials b^a1 and b^a2, those values are (apparently) unrelated to the Diffie-Hellman secret
(b^a1)^a2, since the environment cannot distinguish this secret from the exponential of any fresh unrelated value a3.
The remaining two examples concern applications beyond proofs of static equivalences.
Example 3. Non-deterministic encryption is a variant of public-key encryption that further protects the secrecy of the
plaintext by embedding some additional, fresh value in each encryption. It can be modelled using three functions for
public-key decryption, public-key encryption, and public-key derivation, linked by the equation
pdec(penc(x, pk(y), z), y) = x
where z is the additional parameter for the encryption. A key property of non-deterministic encryption is that, without
knowledge of the decryption key, ciphertexts appear to be unrelated to the plaintexts, even if the attacker knows the
plaintexts and the encryption key. A strong version of this property is that the ciphertexts cannot be distinguished from
freshly generated random values. Formally, we state that
(νs)(c〈pk(s)〉 | !c′(x).(νa)c〈diff[penc(x, pk(s), a), a]〉)
satisfies equivalence. This biprocess is more complex than those presented above; instead of a single output, it performs
a first output to reveal the public key pk(s) (but not s!), then repeatedly inputs a term x from the environment and either
outputs its encryption under pk(s) or outputs a fresh, unrelated name. Thus, a single biprocess represents the family of
static equivalences that relate a series of non-deterministic encryptions for any series of plaintext to a series of fresh,
independent names. (Formally, each such equivalence can be obtained as a corollary of this biprocess equivalence,
by applying the congruence property of equivalence for the particular context that sends the plaintexts of values on
channel c′ and reads the encryption key and encryptions on channel c.)
Example 4. Biprocesses can also be used for relating an abstract specification of a cryptographic primitive with its
implementation in terms of lower-level functions. As an example, we consider the construction of message authen-
tication codes (MACs) for messages of arbitrary length, as modelled in the applied pi calculus [6, Section 6]. MAC
functions are essentially keyed hash functions; MACs should not be subject to tampering or forgery. More formally,
the usage of MACs can be captured via a little protocol that generates MACs on demand and checks them:
P0 = (νk)(!c′(x).c〈x,mac(k, x)〉
| c(x, y).if y = mac(k, x) then c′′〈x〉)
The unforgeability of MACs means that the MAC checker succeeds and forwards a message x on c′′ only if a MAC
has been generated for x by sending it to the MAC generator on c′.
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Let P be P0 with the term diff[mac(k, x), impl(k, x)] instead of the two occurrences of mac(k, x). For a given
signature with no equation for mac, a function impl may be said to implement mac correctly when P satisfies
equivalence. With this formulation, we can verify the correctness of the second construction considered in [6],
impl(k, x) = f (k, f (k, x)), with equation f (k, (x, y)) = h(f (k, x), y), where f is a keyed hash function that iterates
a compression function h on the message blocks. We can also confirm that the first construction considered in [6],
impl(k, x) = f (k, x) with the same equation f (k, (x, y)) = h(f (k, x), y), is subject to a standard extension attack:
anyone that obtains the MAC impl(k,N1) can produce the MAC impl(k, (N1, N2)) as h(impl(k,N1), N2) for any
message extension N2 without knowing k.
5. Modelling equations with rewrite rules
We handle equations by translating from a signature with equations to a signature without equations. This translation
is designed to ease implementation: with it, resolution can continue to rely on ordinary syntactic unification, and remains
very efficient. Although our technique is general and automatic, it does have limitations: it does not apply to some
equational theories, in particular theories with associative symbols such as XOR. (It may be possible to handle some
of those theories by shifting from syntactic unification to unification modulo the theory in question, at the cost of
increased complexity.)
5.1. Definitions
We consider an auxiliary rewriting system on terms, S, that defines partial normal forms. The terms manipulated
by S do not contain diff, but they may contain variables. The rules of S do not contain names and do not have a single
variable on the left-hand side. We say that a term is irreducible by S when none of the rewrite rules of S applies to it;
we say that the set of terms M is in normal form relatively to S and , and write nfS,(M), if and only if all terms of
M are irreducible by S and, for all subterms N1 and N2 of terms of M, if   N1 = N2 then N1 = N2. Intuitively,
we allow for the possibility that terms may have several irreducible forms (see Example 6), requiring that M use
irreducible forms consistently. This requirement implies, for instance, that if the rewrite rule f (x, x) → x applies
modulo the equational theory to a term f (N1, N2) then N1 and N2 are identical and the rule f (x, x) → x also applies
without invoking the equational theory. We extend the definition of nfS,(·) to sets of processes: nfS,(P) if and only
if the set of terms that appear in processes in P is in normal form.
For a signature ′ (without equations), we define evaluation on open terms as a relation D ⇓′ (M, σ), where σ
collects instantiations of D obtained by unification:
M ⇓′ (M,∅)
eval h(D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ (σuN, σuσ ′)
if (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((M1, . . . ,Mn), σ ′),
h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N is in def′(h) and
σu is a most general unifier of (M1, N1), . . . , (Mn,Nn)
(D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((σnM1, . . . , σnMn−1,Mn), σnσ )
if (D1, . . . , Dn−1) ⇓′ ((M1, . . . ,Mn−1), σ ) and σDn ⇓′ (Mn, σn)
As suggested in Section 2, we rely on eval for indicating term evaluations: while f (M1, . . . ,Mn) ⇓′
(f (M1, . . . ,Mn),∅), deriving eval f (M1, . . . ,Mn) ⇓′ (M, σ) requires an application of a rewrite rule for the con-
structor f .
We let addeval(M1, . . . ,Mn) be the tuple of term evaluations obtained by adding eval before each function symbol
of M1, . . . , Mn. Using these definitions, we describe when a signature ′ with rewrite rules models another signature 
with equations:
Definition 4. Let  and ′ be signatures on the same function symbols. We say that ′ models  if and only if
1. The equational theory of ′ is syntactic equality: ′  M = N if and only if M = N .
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2. The constructors of ′ are the constructors of ; their definition def′(f ) contains the rule f (x1, . . . , xn) →
f (x1, . . . , xn), plus perhaps other rules such that there exists a rewriting system S on terms that satisfies the
following properties:
S1. If M → N is in S, then   M = N .
S2. If nfS,(M), then for any term M there exists M ′ such that   M ′ = M and nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}).
S3. If f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N is in def′(f ), then   f (N1, . . . , Nn) = N .
S4. If   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M and nfS,({M1, . . . ,Mn,M}), then there exist σ and f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N in
def′(f ) such that M = σN and Mi = σNi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3. The destructors of ′ are the destructors of , with a rule g(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) → M ′ in def′(g) for each
g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M in def(g) and eachaddeval(M1, . . . ,Mn,M) ⇓′ ((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n,M ′), σ ).
Condition 1 says that the equational theory of ′ is trivial. In Condition 2, Properties S1 and S2 concern the
relation of S and . Property S1 guarantees that all rewrite rules of S are sound according to the equational theory
of . Property S2 requires there are “enough” normal forms: that for every term M there is an S-irreducible -equal
term M ′, and that M ′ can be chosen consistently with a set M in normal form. Properties S3 and S4 concern the
definition of constructors in ′. Property S3 guarantees that the rewrite rules that define the constructors are sound
according to the equational theory of . Property S4 requires that there are “enough” rewrite rules: basically, that when
M1, . . . , Mn are in normal form, every normal form of f (M1, . . . ,Mn) can be generated by applying a rewrite rule
for f in ′ to f (M1, . . . ,Mn). Finally, according to Condition 3, the definition of destructors in ′ can be computed
by applying the rewrite rules of constructors in ′ to the definition of destructors in .
According to this definition, we deal with any equations on f in  by evaluating f once in ′. (We use eval markers
in expressions accordingly: eval f and f represent f before and after this evaluation, respectively.) This characteristic
entails a limitation of our approach. For instance, suppose that we have f (f ′(x)) = f ′(f (x)) in the equational theory
of , and we want a ′ that models . In ′, we should equate f ′(f (. . . f (a))) and f (. . . f (f ′(a))) by one reduction
step, so we need one rewrite rule for each length of sequence of applications of f , so def′(f ′) cannot be finite.
Associative symbols like XOR pose a similar problem.
5.2. Examples
The following two examples illustrate the definitions of Section 5.1. ProVerif handles these examples automatically,
using the approach of Section 5.3.
Example 5. Suppose that  has the constructors enc and dec with the equations
dec(enc(x, y), y) = x enc(dec(x, y), y) = x
In ′, we adopt the rewrite rules:
dec(x, y) → dec(x, y) enc(x, y) → enc(x, y)
dec(enc(x, y), y) → x enc(dec(x, y), y) → x
We have that ′ models  for the rewriting system S with rules dec(enc(x, y), y) → x and enc(dec(x, y), y) → x,
and a single normal form for every term.
Example 6. In order to model the Diffie-Hellman equation of Example 2, we define ′ with three rewrite rules:
b → b x^y → x^y (b^x)^y → (b^y)^x
and use an empty S. Intuitively, applying ^ to (b^x) and y yields both possible forms of (b^x)^y modulo the equational
theory, (b^x)^y and (b^y)^x. Hence, a term M may have several irreducible forms M ′ that satisfy nfS,({M ′}) and
  M ′ = M: one can choose (b^N)^N ′ or (b^N ′)^N .
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5.3. Algorithms
Next we explain a method for finding, for a given signature , a signature ′ that models  and a correspond-
ing rewriting system S. This method is embodied in algorithms that, when they terminate, yield the definition of
def′(f ) for each constructor of . The definition of def′(g) for each destructor of  follows from Condition 3
of Definition 4. These algorithms do not always terminate because, for some equational theories, they generate an
unbounded number of rewrite rules. However, they often terminate in practice, as our examples illustrate; moreover,
Lemma 7 in Appendix A.2 establishes a termination result for a significant class of theories, the convergent subterm
theories [5].
Our first algorithm handles convergent (terminating and confluent) theories. It applies, for instance, to Example 5.
Here and elsewhere, we write T for a term context (a term with a hole).
Algorithm 1 (Convergent theories). Let Mi = Ni (for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}) be the equations that define the equational
theory of . Let S be defined by the rewrite rules Mi → Ni . Assume that S is convergent, and let M↓ be the normal
form of M relatively to S.
When E is a set of rewrite rules, we define normalize(E) by
– replacing each rule f (M1, . . . ,Mn) → N of E with f (M1↓, . . . ,Mn↓) → N↓;
– removing rules of the form M → M from E;
– if M → N is in E, removing all other rules of the form T [σM] → T [σN ] from E.
Let E = normalize(S).
Repeat until E reaches a fixpoint
For each pair of rules M → M ′ and N → N ′ in E and each T
such that M ′ = T [M ′′], M ′′ is not a variable,
and σu is the most general unifier of M ′′ and N ,
set E = normalize(E ∪ {σuM → σuT [σuN ′]}).
For each constructor f ,
def′(f ) = {f (M1, . . . ,Mn)→N ∈ E} ∪ {f (x1, . . . , xn) → f (x1, . . . , xn)}.
In this algorithm, we add to E new rewrite rules obtained by composing two rewrite rules of E, until a fixpoint is
reached. Lemma 7 in Appendix A.2 shows that a fixpoint is reached immediately for convergent subterm theories.
Before running the algorithm, we can check that S is convergent as follows.
• The termination of S can be established via a reduction ordering >, by showing that if M → M ′ is in S, then
M > M ′. In the implementation, we use a lexicographic path ordering.
• The confluence ofS can be established via the critical-pair theorem, by showing that all critical pairs are joinable [31].
Alternatively, one could use the Knuth-Bendix completion algorithm in order to transform a rewriting system into a
convergent one.
Our next algorithm handles linear theories, such as that of Example 6.
Algorithm 2 (Linear theories). Let  be a signature such that all equations of  are linear: each variable occurs at
most once in the left-hand side and at most once in the right-hand side. Let S be empty.
When E is a set of rewrite rules, we define normalize(E) by:
– removing rules of the form M → M from E;
– if M → N is in E, removing all other rules of the form T [σM] → T [σN ] from E.
Let E = normalize({M → N,N → M | M = N is an equation of }).
Repeat until E reaches a fixpoint
For each pair of rules M → M ′ and N → N ′ in E and each T
such that M ′ = T [M ′′], M ′′ and N are not variables,
and σu is the most general unifier of M ′′ and N ,
set E = normalize(E ∪ {σuM → σuT [σuN ′]}).
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For each pair of rules M → M ′ and N → N ′ in E and each T
such that N = T [N ′′], M ′ and N ′′ are not variables,
and σu is the most general unifier of M ′ and N ′′,
set E = normalize(E ∪ {σuT [σuM] → σuN ′}).
For each constructor f ,
def′(f ) = {f (M1, . . . ,Mn) → N ∈ E} ∪ {f (x1, . . . , xn) → f (x1, . . . , xn)}.
In this algorithm, when two rewrite rules of E have a critical pair with one another, we compose them and add the
result to E.
Algorithms 1 and 2 are similar. The main difference is that Algorithm 1 performs additional optimizations that are
sound for convergent rewriting systems but not for linear equational theories. In particular, in the initial definition of E,
Algorithm 1 considers rewrite rules oriented only in the direction of S, while Algorithm 2 considers both directions.
Furthermore, in Algorithm 1, normalize reduces the right-hand sides and the strict subterms of the left-hand sides of
rewrite rules by S, while Algorithm 2 does not include this reduction. As a consequence, the second way of combining
rules of E in Algorithm 2 is not necessary in Algorithm 1, since the rules thus created would be reduced by normalize
into an instance of an already existing rule.
Our final algorithm combines the two previous ones:
Algorithm 3 (Union). Let  be a signature.
Split the set of equations of  into subsets Ei that use disjoint sets of constructors.
Let Econv be the union of those subsets Ei that we can prove convergent.
Let Elin be the union of those subsets Ei that are linear and are not in Econv.
If some subsets Ei are neither in Econv nor in Elin, then fail.
Apply Algorithm 1 to Econv, obtaining the rewriting system Sconv and the definition def′(f ) of the constructors
of Econv.
Apply Algorithm 2 to Elin, obtaining the definition def′(f ) of the constructors of Elin.
Let S = Sconv.
The following theorem says that these three algorithms are correct. It is proved in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. If Algorithm 1, 2, or 3 produces a signature ′ from a signature , then ′ models .
5.4. Reductions with equations and rewrite rules
From this point on, we assume that ′ models . We extend equality modulo  from terms to biprocesses and
term evaluations:   P = P ′ if and only if P ′ can be obtained from P by replacing some of its subterms M (not
containing diff or eval) with subterms equal modulo. We define  D = D′ similarly. Finally, we defineP →′, P ′
as P → P ′ except that signature ′ is used for reduction rules (Red I/O) and (Red Fun 1)—signature  is still used
for (Red Fun 2).
We say that a biprocess P0 is unevaluated when every term in P0 is either a variable or diff[a, a] for some name a.
Hence, every function symbol in P0 must be in a term evaluation and prefixed by eval. For any biprocess P , we can
build an unevaluated biprocess unevaluated(P ) by introducing a term evaluation for every non-trivial term and a diff for
every name (with P ≈ unevaluated(P )). For instance, the unevaluated biprocess built from the process of Example 3
is
(νs)(let y = eval pk(diff[s, s]) in diff[c, c]〈y〉 |
!diff[c′, c′](x).(νa)
let z = diff[eval enc(x, eval pk(diff[s, s]), diff[a, a]), diff[a, a]] in diff[c, c]〈z〉)
Lemma 1. Let P0 be a closed, unevaluated biprocess. If P0 →∗≡ P ′0,   P ′0 = P ′, and nfS,({P ′}), then
P0 →∗′,≡ P ′. Conversely, if P0 →∗′,≡ P ′ then there exists P ′0 such that   P ′0 = P ′ and P0 →∗≡ P ′0.
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This lemma gives an operational correspondence between → and →′, . A similar lemma holds for processes
instead of biprocesses, and can be used for extending previous proof techniques for secrecy [3] and correspondence [16]
properties, so that they apply under equational theories. These extensions are implemented in ProVerif. We do not detail
them further since we focus on equivalences in this paper. Using Lemma 1, we obtain:
Lemma 2. A closed biprocess P0 satisfies the conditions of Corollary 1 if and only if, for all plain evaluation contexts
C, all evaluation contexts C′, and all reductions unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′, P, we have
1. if P ≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] and fst(N) = fst(N ′), then   snd(N) = snd(N ′),
2. if P ≡ C′[let x = D in Q else R] and fst(D)⇓′ M1 for some M1, then snd(D)⇓ M2 for some M2,
as well as the symmetric properties where we swap fst and snd.
The lemmas above are proved in Appendix B.
6. Clause generation
Given a closed biprocess P0, our protocol verifier builds a set of Horn clauses. This section explains the generation
of the clauses, substantially extending to biprocesses previous work at the level of processes.
6.1. Patterns and facts
In the clauses, the terms of processes are represented by patterns, with the following grammar:
p ::= patterns
x, y, z, i variable
f (p1, . . . , pn) constructor application
a[p1, . . . , pn] name
g element of GVar
We assign a distinct, fresh session identifier variable i to each replication of P0. (We will use a distinct value for
i for each copy of the replicated process.) We assign a pattern a[p1, . . . , pn] to each name a of P0. We treat a as a
function symbol, and write a[p1, . . . , pn] rather than a(p1, . . . , pn) only for clarity. We sometimes write a for a[ ]. If
a is a free name, then its pattern is a[ ]. If a is bound by a restriction (νa) in P0, then its pattern takes as arguments the
terms received as inputs, the results of term evaluations, and the session identifiers of replications in the context that
encloses the restriction. For example, in the process !c′(x).(νa)P , each name created by (νa) is represented by a[i, x]
where i is the session identifier for the replication and x is the message received as input in c′(x). We assume that each
restriction (νa) in P0 has a different name a, distinct from any free name of P0. Moreover, session identifiers enable
us to distinguish names created in different copies of processes. Hence, each name created in the process calculus is
represented by a different pattern in the verifier.
Patterns include an infinite set of constants GVar. These constants are basically universally quantified variables,
and occur only in arguments of the predicate nounif, defined in Definition 5 below. We write GVar(M) for the term
obtained from M by replacing the variables of M with new constants in the set GVar.
Clauses are built from the following predicates:
F ::= facts
att′(p, p′) attacker knowledge
msg′(p1, p2, p′1, p′2) output message p2 on p1 (resp. p′2 on p′1)
input′(p, p′) input on p (resp. p′)
nounif(p, p′) impossible unification
bad bad
Informally, att′(p, p′) means that the attacker may obtain p in fst(P ) and p′ in snd(P ) by the same operations;
msg′(p1, p2, p′1, p′2) means that message p2 may appear on channel p1 in fst(P ) and that message p′2 may appear on
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channel p′1 in snd(P ) after the same reductions; input
′(p, p′) means that an input may be executed on channel p in
fst(P ) and on channel p′ in snd(P ), thus enabling the attacker to infer whether p (resp. p′) is equal to another channel
used for output; nounif(p, p′) means that p and p′ cannot be unified modulo  by substituting elements of GVar with
patterns; finally, bad serves in detecting violations of observational equivalence: when bad is not derivable, we have
observational equivalence.
An evident difference with respect to previous translations from processes to clauses is that predicates have twice
as many arguments: we use the binary predicate att′ instead of the unary one att and the 4-ary predicate msg′ instead
of the binary one msg. This extension allows us to represent information for both variants of a biprocess.
The predicate nounif is not defined by clauses, but by special simplification steps in the solver, defined in Section 7.
Definition 5. Let p and p′ be closed patterns. The fact nounif(p, p′) holds if and only if there is no closed substitution
σ with domain GVar such that   σp = σp′.
6.2. Clauses for the attacker
The following clauses represent the capabilities of the attacker:
For each a ∈ fn(P0), att′(a[ ], a[ ]) (Rinit)
For some b that does not occur in P0, att′(b[x], b[x]) (Rn)
For each function h,
for each pair of rewrite rules h(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M and h(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) → M ′ in def′(h)
(after renaming of variables),
att′(M1,M ′1) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(Mn,M ′n) → att′(M,M ′)
(Rf)
msg′(x, y, x′, y′) ∧ att′(x, x′) → att′(y, y′) (Rl)
att′(x, x′) ∧ att′(y, y′) → msg′(x, y, x′, y′) (Rs)
att′(x, x′) → input′(x, x′) (Ri)
input′(x, x′) ∧ msg′(x, z, y′, z′) ∧ nounif(x′, y′) → bad (Rcom)
For each destructor g,
for each rewrite rule g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M in def′(g),∧
g(M ′1,... ,M ′n)→M ′ in def′ (g)
nounif((x′1, . . . , x′n),GVar((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n)))
∧ att′(M1, x′1) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(Mn, x′n) → bad
(Rt)
plus symmetric clauses (Rcom′) and (Rt′) obtained from (Rcom) and (Rt) by swapping the first and second arguments
of input′ and att′ and the first and third arguments of msg′.
Clause (Ri) means that, if the attacker has x (resp. x′), then it can attempt an input on x (resp. x′), thereby testing
whether it is equal to some other channel used for output. Clauses (Rcom) and (Rcom′) detect when a communication
can occur in one variant of the biprocess and not in the other: the input and output channels are equal in one variant
and different in the other. These clauses check that condition 1 of Lemma 2 and its symmetric are true.
Clause (Rt) checks that for all applications of a destructor g, if this application succeeds in fst(P ), then it succeeds
in snd(P ), possibly using another rule. Clause (Rt′) checks the converse. These two clauses are essential for obtaining
condition 2 of Lemma 2. Consider, for instance, the destructor equals of Section 2.2. After a minor simplification,
Clauses (Rt) and (Rt′) become
att′(x, y) ∧ att′(x, y′) ∧ nounif(y, y′) → bad (1)
att′(y, x) ∧ att′(y′, x) ∧ nounif(y, y′) → bad (2)
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The other clauses are adapted from previous work [3,16] by replacing unary (resp. binary) predicates with binary
(resp. 4-ary) ones. Clause (Rinit) indicates that the attacker initially has all free names of P0. Clause (Rn) means that
the attacker can generate fresh names b[x]. Clause (Rf) mean that the attacker can apply all functions to all terms it
has. In this clause, the rewrite rules h(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M and h(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) → M ′ may be different elements of
def′(h); their variables are renamed so that M1, . . . ,Mn,M on the one hand and M ′1, . . . ,M ′n,M ′ on the other hand
do not share variables. Clause (Rl) means that the attacker can listen on all the channels it has, and (Rs) that it can send
all the messages it has on all the channels it has.
6.3. Clauses for the protocol
The translation [[P ]]ρss′H of a biprocess P is a set of clauses, where ρ is an environment that associates a pair
of patterns with each name and variable, s and s′ are sequences of patterns, and H is a sequence of facts. The empty
sequence is written ∅; the concatenation of a pattern p to the sequence s is written s, p; the concatenation of a
fact F to the sequence H is written H ∧ F . When ρ associates a pair of patterns with each name and variable, and
f is a constructor, we extend ρ as a substitution by ρ(f (M1, . . . ,Mn)) = (f (p1, . . . , pn), f (p′1, . . . , p′n)) where
ρ(Mi) = (pi, p′i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote by ρ(M)1 and ρ(M)2 the components of the pair ρ(M). We let
ρ(diff[M,M ′]) = (ρ(M)1, ρ(M ′)2). We define [[P ]]ρss′H as follows:
[[0]]ρss′H = ∅
[[!P ]]ρss′H = [[P ]]ρ(s, i)(s′, i)H
where i is a fresh variable
[[P | Q]]ρss′H = [[P ]]ρss′H ∪ [[Q]]ρss′H
[[(νa)P ]]ρss′H = [[P ]](ρ[a → (a[s], a[s′])])ss′H
[[M(x).P ]]ρss′H =
[[P ]](ρ[x → (x′, x′′)])(s, x′)(s′, x′′)(H ∧ msg′(ρ(M)1, x′, ρ(M)2, x′′))
∪ {H → input′(ρ(M)1, ρ(M)2)}
where x′ and x′′ are fresh variables
[[M〈N〉.P ]]ρss′H = [[P ]]ρss′H ∪ {H → msg′(ρ(M)1, ρ(N)1, ρ(M)2, ρ(N)2)}
[[let x = D in P else Q]]ρss′H =
⋃
{[[P ]]((σρ)[x → (p, p′)])(σ s, p)(σ s′, p′)(σH) | (ρ(D)1, ρ(D)2) ⇓′ ((p, p′), σ )}
∪ [[Q]]ρss′(H ∧ ρ(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧ ρ(fails(snd(D)))2)
∪ {σH ∧ σρ(fails(snd(D)))2 → bad | ρ(D)1 ⇓′ (p, σ )}
∪ {σH ∧ σρ(fails(fst(D)))1 → bad | ρ(D)2 ⇓′ (p′, σ )}
where fails(D) =∧σ |D ⇓′(p,σ ) nounif(D,GVar(σD))
In the translation, the environment ρ maps names and variables to their corresponding pair of patterns—one pattern
for each variant of the biprocess. The sequences s and s′ contain all input messages, session identifiers, and results
of term evaluations in the enclosing context—one sequence for each variant of the biprocess. They are used in the
restriction case (νa)P , to build patterns a[s] and a[s′] that correspond to the name a. The sequence H contains all
facts that must be true to run the current process.
The clauses generated are similar to those of [16], but clauses are added to indicate which tests the adversary can
perform, and predicates have twice as many arguments.
• Replication creates a new session identifier i, added to s and s′. Replication is otherwise ignored, since Horn clauses
can be applied any number of times anyway.
• In the translation of an input, the sequence H is extended with the input in question and the environment ρ with a
binding of x to a new variable x′ in variant 1, x′′ in variant 2. Moreover, a new clause H → input′(ρ(M)1, ρ(M)2)
is added, indicating that when all conditions in H are true, an input on channel M may be executed. This input may
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enable the adversary to infer that M is equal to some channel used for output; Clauses (Rcom) or (Rcom′) derive
bad when this information may break equivalence.
• The output case adds a clause stating that message N may be sent on channel M .
• Finally, the clauses for a term evaluation are the union of clauses for the cases where the term evaluation succeeds
on both sides (then we execute P ), where the term evaluation fails on both sides (then we execute Q), and where
the term evaluation fails on one side and succeeds on the other (then we derive bad). Indeed, in the last case, the
adversary may get to know whether the term evaluation succeeds or fails (when the code executed in the success
case is visibly different from the code executed in the failure case).
Example 7. The biprocess of Example 3 yields the clauses:
msg′(c, pk(s), c, pk(s))
msg′(c′, x, c′, x′) → msg′(c, penc(x, pk(s), a[i, x]), c, a[i, x′])
The first clause corresponds to the output of the public key pk(s). The second clause corresponds to the other output: if a
message x (resp. x′) is received on channel c′, then the message penc(x, pk(s), a[i, x]) in the first variant (resp. a[i, x′]
in the second variant) is sent on channel c. The encoding of the fresh name a as a pattern a[i, x] is explained in
Section 6.1.
Example 8. The process c(x).let y = eval dec(x, a) in c〈y〉, where dec is a destructor defined by dec(enc(x, y),
y) → x, yields the clauses:
msg′(c, enc(y, a), c, x′) ∧ nounif(x′, enc(g, a)) → bad
msg′(c, x, c, enc(y′, a)) ∧ nounif(x, enc(g, a)) → bad
msg′(c, enc(y, a), c, enc(y′, a)) → msg′(c, y, c, y′)
In the first clause, a message received on c is of the form enc(y, a) in the first variant but not in the second variant;
decryption succeeds only in the first variant, so the process is not uniform and we derive bad. The second clause is the
symmetric case. In the third clause, decryption succeeds in both variants, and yields an output on channel c.
6.4. Proving equivalences
Let ρ0 = {a → (a[ ], a[ ]) | a ∈ fn(P0)}. We define the set of clauses that corresponds to biprocess P0 as:
RP0 = [[unevaluated(P0)]]ρ0∅∅∅ ∪ {(Rinit), (Rn), . . . , (Rt), (Rt′)}
The following result is proved in Appendix D. It shows the soundness of the translation.
Theorem 3. If bad is not a logical consequence of RP0 , then P0 satisfies observational equivalence.
When bad is a logical consequence of RP0 , the derivation of bad from RP0 can serve for reconstructing a vi-
olation of the hypothesis of Corollary 1, via an extension of recent techniques for secrecy analysis [10]. However,
the translation of protocols to Horn clauses performs safe abstractions that sometimes result in false counterexam-
ples: the Horn clauses can be applied any number of times, so the translation ignores the number of repetitions
of actions. For instance, (νc)(c〈M〉 | c(x).c(x).P ) satisfies equivalence for any P because P is never executed, and
(νc)(c〈diff[M1,M2]〉 | c(x).d〈c〉) satisfies equivalence for anyM1 andM2 because its diff disappears before the attacker
obtains channel c. Our technique cannot prove these equivalences in general. The latter example illustrates that our
technique typically fails for biprocesses that first keep some value secret and later reveal it. The reason for the failures
on (νc)(c〈M〉 | c(x).c(x).P ) and (νc)(c〈diff[M1,M2]〉 | c(x).d〈c〉) is that the translation to classical Horn clauses
basically treats these two biprocesses like variants with additional replications, namely (νc)(!c〈M〉 | c(x).c(x).P ) and
(νc)(!c〈diff[M1,M2]〉 | !c(x).d〈c〉) respectively, and these variants do not necessarily satisfy equivalence. On the other
hand, the safe abstractions that the translation performs are crucial for the applicability of our technique to infinite-state
systems, which is illustrated by many of the examples in this paper.
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We also have the following lemma, which is important for proving the soundness of some simplification steps in
the solving algorithm below, enabling us to work with terms in normal form only. It is proved in Appendix C.
Lemma 3. If bad is derivable from RP0 then bad is derivable from RP0 by a derivation such that nfS,(F) where F
is the set of intermediately derived facts in this derivation, excluding nounif facts.
7. Solving algorithm
In order to determine whether bad is a logical consequence of RP0 , we use an algorithm based on resolution with
free selection, adapting a previous algorithm [17].
7.1. The basic resolution algorithm
The algorithm infers new clauses by resolution, as follows. From two clauses R = H → C and R′ = F ∧ H ′ → C′
(where F is any hypothesis of R′) such that C and F are unifiable, with most general unifier σ , it infers R ◦F R′ =
σH ∧ σH ′ → σC′:
H → C F ∧ H ′ → C′
σH ∧ σH ′ → σC′
The clause R ◦F R′ is the combination of R and R′, in which R proves the hypothesis F of R′. Resolution is guided
by a selection function: sel(R) returns a subset of the hypotheses of R, and the resolution step above applies only when
sel(R) = ∅ and F ∈ sel(R′). When sel(R) = ∅, we say that the conclusion of R is selected. In this paper, we use the
following selection rules:
• nounif(p1, p2) is never selected. (It is handled by special simplification steps.)
• bad is never selected, except in the clause bad, and in clauses whose hypotheses are all of the form nounif(p1, p2).
(If we select bad in a clause H → bad, then the algorithm will fail to prove that bad is not derivable. That is why
we avoid selecting bad when possible.)
• att′(x, x′) with any variables x, x′ is selected only when no other fact can be selected. (Our intent is to obtain
termination, whereas facts att′(x, x′) can be unified with all facts att′(p, p′) to generate many additional clauses.)
In this case, att′(x, x′) is selected preferably when x (or x′) occurs in a fact nounif(x, p′) where p′ is not a variable.
(When we select att′(x, x′), this fact will be unified with some other fact, thus hopefully instantiating x, so that we
make progress determining whether nounif(x, p′) is true or not.)
7.2. General simplifications
As part of the algorithm, we apply a series of simplification functions on clauses. Some of them are standard, such
as the elimination of tautologies (performed by elimtaut) and duplicate hypotheses (performed by elimdup). We omit
their definitions. Others are specific to our purpose:
• Elimination of att′(x, y): elimattx removes hypotheses att′(x, y) when x and y do not appear elsewhere in the clause,
except possibly in nounif facts. The variables x and y may be the same variable.
• Elimination of useless variables: elimvar transforms clauses of the form
R = att′(x, y) ∧ att′(x, y′) ∧ H → C
into R{y/y′}, when R is not Clause (1).
The soundness of elimvar can be established by cases. If we can derive facts att′(px, py) and att′(px, py′) such that
  py /= py′ from the other clauses, then we can derive bad by applying Clause (1), included in the clause base
as Clause (Rt) for g = equals. Otherwise, in any derivation of bad obtained by Lemma 3, any application of R uses
the same fact to match both att′(x, y) and att′(x, y′), and the transformed clause also applies. (The clause R uses
att′(px, py) and att′(px, py′) with   py = py′ , hence py = py′ by the conclusion of Lemma 3.)
The function elimvar also performs the symmetric simplification, relying on the presence of Clause (2).
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• Elimination of useless forms modulo equality: simpeq removes clauses that contain a fact F that is not a nounif fact
and is not in normal form relatively to S. The soundness of this simplification follows from Lemma 3. A typical
example concerns decryption, when it is defined by an equation (as in Example 5): we can remove any clause that
contains dec(enc(y, x), x).
This simplification could be extended to clauses that contain several syntactically different forms of the same term
modulo the equational theory, although that would be more difficult to implement.
7.3. Simplifications for nounif
These simplifications are adapted from those for testunif (from [17]).
• Unification: unify transforms clauses of the form H ∧ nounif(p1, p2) → C as follows. For every nounif(p1, p2)
hypothesis in turn, it tries to unifyp1 andp2 modulo the equational theory, considering elements of GVar as variables.
If this unification fails, then the clause becomes H → C, because nounif(p1, p2) holds when   σp1 /= σp2 for
all σ . Otherwise, unify replaces the clause with
H ∧
n∧
j=1
nounif
(
(x
j
1 , . . . , x
j
kj
), (σj x
j
1 , . . . , σj x
j
kj
)
)→ C
where σ1, . . . , σn are the most general unifiers of p1 and p2 modulo the equational theory and xj1 , . . . , x
j
kj
are all
variables affected byσj . (These may include elements of GVar.) In this unification,σj is built so that all variables in its
domain and its image are variables ofp1 andp2, and the variables in its domain do not occur in its image. Note that an
instance of
∧n
j=1 nounif((x
j
1 , . . . , x
j
kj
), (σj x
j
1 , . . . , σj x
j
kj
)) is true if and only if the same instance of nounif(p1, p2)
is, because σp1 = σp2 if and only if there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σ(xj1 , . . . , xjkj ) = σσj (x
j
1 , . . . , x
j
kj
), for
all σ with domain GVar ∪ Var where Var is the set of variables.
In order to compute unification modulo the equational theory of p1 and p2, we rewrite both terms according to the
rewrite rules for the function symbols that they contain (generating some bindings for variables), then syntactically
unify the results. Formally, the most general unifiers of p1 and p2 modulo  are the substitutions σuσ such that
addeval(p1, p2) ⇓′ ((p′1, p′2), σ ) and σu is the most general unifier of p′1 and p′2.
For instance, with an empty equational theory, unify transforms the clause
H ∧ nounif((enc(x′, y′), z′), (enc(g, y), g)) → C
into
H ∧ nounif((x′, y′, z′), (g, y, g)) → C (3)
Assuming the equational theory of Example 6, unify transforms the clause
H ∧ nounif(x^y, x′^y′) → C
into
H ∧ nounif((x, y), (x′, y′)) ∧ nounif((x, x′), (b^y′, b^y)) → C
• Swap: swap transforms facts nounif((p1, . . . , pn), (p′1, . . . , p′n)) in clauses obtained after unify. When pi is a
variable and p′i ∈ GVar, it swaps pi and p′i everywhere in the nounif fact. Note that an instance of the new nounif
fact is true if and only if the same instance of the old one is, since the unification constraints remain the same.
For instance, swap transforms Clause (3) into
H ∧ nounif((g, y′, z′), (x′, y, x′)) → C (4)
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• Elimination of elements of GVar: elimGVar transforms facts nounif((p1, . . . , pn), (p′1, . . . , p′n)) in clauses ob-
tained after unify and swap: when pi = g ∈ GVar, it eliminates the pair pi, p′i from the nounif fact.
An instance of the new nounif fact is true if and only if the same instance of the old one is, because g ∈ GVar cannot
occur elsewhere in the nounif fact. (This property comes from the result of unify and is preserved by swap.)
For instance, elimGVar transforms Clause (4) into
H ∧ nounif((y′, z′), (y, x′)) → C
• Detection of failed nounif: elimnouniffalse removes clauses that contain the hypothesis nounif((), ()).
7.4. Combining the simplifications
We group all simplifications, as follows:
• We define the simplification function
simplify = elimtaut ◦ elimattx ◦ elimdup ◦ elimnouniffalse ◦ repeat(elimGVar ◦ swap ◦ unify ◦ elimvar ◦ simpeq).
The expression repeat(f ) means that the application of function f is repeated until a fixpoint is obtained, that is,
f (R) = R. It is enough to repeat the simplification only when elimvar has modified the set of clauses. Indeed,
no new simplification would be done in the other cases. The repetition never leads to an infinite loop, because the
number of variables decreases at each iteration.
• We let condense(R) apply simplify to R and then eliminate subsumed clauses. We say that H1 → C1 subsumes
H2 → C2 (and we write (H1 → C1)  (H2 → C2)) if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that σC1 = C2
and σH1 ⊆ H2 (as a multiset inclusion). If R contains clauses R and R′ such that R subsumes R′, then R′ is
removed. (In that case, R can do all derivations that R′ can do.)
Finally, we define the algorithm saturate(R0). Starting from condense(R0), the algorithm adds clauses inferred by
resolution with the selection function sel and condenses the resulting clause set until a fixpoint is reached. When a
fixpoint is reached, saturate(R0) is the set of clauses R in the clause set such that sel(R) = ∅.
We have the following soundness result:
Theorem 4. If saturate(RP0) terminates and its result contains no clause of the form H → bad, then bad is not
derivable from RP0 .
This result is proved in Appendix E.
8. Extension to scenarios with several stages
Many protocols can be broken into stages, and their security properties can be formulated in terms of these stages.
Typically, for instance, if a protocol discloses a session key after the conclusion of a session, then the secrecy of the
data exchanged during the session may be compromised but not its authenticity. In some cases, the disclosure of keys
and other keying material is harmless and even useful at certain points in protocol executions (e.g., [2]). In this section
we extend our technique to protocols with several successive stages. This extension consists in the following changes:
• The syntax of processes is supplemented with a stage prefix, t : P , where t is a nonnegative integer. Intuitively, t
represents a global clock, and the process t : P is active only during stage t .
• The semantics of processes (and biprocesses) is extended by adding the rules of Fig. 4 to those of Figs. 2 and 3. This
new semantics is a refinement, since P → Q in the simple semantics if and only if t : P →t t : Q in the refined
semantics. Conversely, if P ′ →t Q′ for staged processes, then P → Q in the simple semantics, where P and Q
are obtained from P ′ and Q′ by erasing all stage prefixes.
• Instead of att′, msg′, and input′, the clause generation uses distinct predicates att′t , msg′t , and input′t for each stage
t used in the protocol. The clauses for the protocol use the predicates indexed by t when translating the process P
in t : P . The clauses for the attacker are replicated for each att′t . In addition, new clauses carry over the attacker’s
knowledge from one stage to the next:
att′t (x, x′) → att′t+1(x, x′) (Rp)
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(νa)t : P ≡ t : (νa)P
t : (P | Q) ≡ t : P | t : Q
t : t ′ : P ≡ t ′ : P if t < t ′
P → Q ⇒ t : P →t t : Q (Red Stage)
P →t Q ⇒ P | R →t Q | R (Red Par)
P →t Q ⇒ (νa)P →t (νa)Q (Red Res)
P ′ ≡ P, P →t Q, Q ≡ Q′ ⇒ P ′ →t Q′ (Red ≡)
Fig. 4. Semantics for stages.
As an optimization, when the protocol uses only plain processes for the initial stages t ≤ i (that is, diff occurs only
at later stages), we translate these processes using the more efficient clause generation of [3], with predicates that
keep track of a single process, rather than the two variants of a biprocess.
• Our main theorems hold for staged biprocesses, with minor adaptations and extra optimizations in algorithms.
In particular, all definitions and theorems now use →
_
= ∪t≥0 →t instead of →.
9. Applications
This section surveys some of the applications of our proof method. The total runtime of all proof scripts for the
experiments described below is 45 s on a Pentium M 1.8 GHz. None of these applications could be handled by ProVerif
without the extensions presented in this paper.
9.1. Weak secrets
A weak secret represents a secret value with low entropy, such as a human-memorizable password. Protocols that
rely on weak secrets are often subject to guessing attacks, whereby an attacker guesses a weak secret, perhaps using
a dictionary, and verifies its guess. The guess verification may rely on interaction with protocol participants or on
computations on intercepted messages (e.g., [13,35,36]). With some care in protocol design, however, those attacks
can be prevented:
• On-line guessing attacks can be mitigated by limiting the number of retries that participants allow. An attacker that
repeatedly attempts to guess the weak secret should be eventually detected and stopped if it tries to verify its guesses
by interacting with other participants.
• Off-line guessing attacks can be prevented by making sure that, even if the attacker (systematically) guesses the
weak secret, it cannot verify whether its guess is correct by computing on intercepted traffic.
Off-line guessing attacks can be explained and modelled in terms of a 2-stage scenario. In stage 0, on-line attacks
are possible, but the weak secret is otherwise unguessable. In stage 1, the attacker obtains a possible value for the
weak secret (intuitively, by guessing it). The absence of off-line attacks is characterized by an equivalence: the attacker
cannot distinguish the weak secret used in stage 0 from an unrelated fresh value.
In our calculus, we arrive at the following definition:
Definition 6 (Weak secrecy). Let P be a closed process with no stage prefix. We say that P prevents off-line attacks
against w when (νw)(0 : P | 1 : (νw′)c〈diff[w,w′]〉) satisfies observational equivalence.
This definition is in line with the work of Cohen, Corin et al., Delaune and Jacquemard, Drielsma et al., and Lowe [26,
27,28,30,32,41]. Lowe uses the model-checker FDR to handle a bounded number of sessions, while Delaune and
Jacquemard give a decision procedure in this case. Corin et al. give a definition based on equivalence like ours, but do
not consider the first, active stage; they analyze only one session.
As a first example, assume that a principal attempts to prove knowledge of a shared password w to a trusted server
by sending a hash of this password encrypted under the server’s public key. (For simplicity, the protocol does not aim
to provide freshness guarantees, so anyone may replay this proof.) Omitting the code for the server, a first protocol
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may be written:
P = (νs)c〈pk(s)〉.c〈penc(h(w), pk(s))〉
The first output reveals the public key of the server; the second output communicates the proof of knowledge of w.
This protocol does not prevent off-line attacks against w. ProVerif finds an attack that corresponds to the following
adversary:
A = 0 : c(pk).c(e).
1 : c(w).if e = penc(h(w), pk) then Guessed〈〉
A corrected protocol uses non-deterministic encryption (see Example 3):
P = (νs, a)c〈pk(s)〉.c〈penc(h(w), pk(s), a)〉
ProVerif automatically produces a proof for this corrected protocol.
As a second example, we consider a simplified version of EKE [13]:
PA = (νdA)c〈enc(b^dA,w)〉
PB = c(x).(νdB)let k = dec(x,w)^dB in c〈enc(b^dB,w), k〉
P = !PA | !PB
Here, two parties obtain a shared session key k = (b^dA)^dB via a Diffie-Hellman exchange, in which b^dA and b^dB
are exchanged protected by a weak secret w. The EKE protocol has several rounds of key confirmation; here, instead,
we immediately give the session key k to the attacker. Still, relying on the contextual property of equivalence, we can
define a context that performs these key confirmations. Since that context does not use the weak secret, the resulting
protocol prevents off-line attacks against w as long as the original protocol does.
We have proved security properties of several versions of EKE: the public-key and the Diffie-Hellman versions for
EKE [13], and the version with hashed passwords and the one with signatures for Augmented EKE [14]. Unlike the
protocol displayed above, our models include an unbounded number of possibly dishonest principals that run parallel
sessions.
For the analysis of such protocols, we define encryption under a weak secret by the equational theory of Example 5.
The use of this equational theory is important, as it entails that the adversary cannot check whether a decryption is
successful and thereby check a guess. In contrast, a straightforward presentation with constructors and destructors but
without the equational theory (see Section 2.1) would not be adequate in this respect: with that presentation, an attacker
could verify a guess w′ of w by testing whether the decryption of the first message of the protocol with w′ succeeds.
9.2. Authenticity
Abadi and Gordon [8] use equivalences for expressing authenticity properties, and treat a variant of the Wide-
Mouth-Frog protocol as an example. In this protocol, two participants A and B share secret keys kAS and kSB with
a server S, respectively. Participant A generates a key kAB , sends it encrypted to S, which forwards it reencrypted to
B. Then A sends the payload x to B encrypted under kAB . Finally, B forwards the payload that it receives, possibly
for further processing. Essentially, authenticity is defined as an equivalence between the protocol and a specification.
The specification is an idealized variant of the protocol, obtained by modifying B so that, independently of what it
receives, it forwards A’s payload x.
For the one-session version [8, Section 3.2.2], the protocol and the specification can be combined into the following
biprocess P0:
PA = (νkAB)c〈enc(kAB, kAS)〉.c〈enc(x, kAB)〉
PS = c(y1).let y2 = dec(y1, kAS) in c〈enc(y2, kSB)〉
PB = c(y3).let y4 = dec(y3, kSB) in c(y5).let x′ = dec(y5, y4) in e〈diff[x, x′]〉
P0 = c(x).(νkAS)(νkSB)(PA | PS | PB)
with the rewrite rule dec(enc(x, y), y) → x for the destructor dec.
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The technique presented in this paper automatically proves that P0 satisfies observational equivalence, and hence
establishes the desired authenticity property. Thus, it eliminates the need for a laborious manual proof. The technique
can also be used for simplifying the proof of authenticity for the multi-session version.
Authenticity properties are sometimes formulated as correspondence assertions on behaviors, rather than as equiv-
alences. Previous work shows how to check those assertions with ProVerif [16]. However, that previous work does not
apply to equivalences.
9.3. Complete sessions in JFK
Finally, we show other ways in which automated proofs of equivalences can contribute to protocol analyses,
specifically studying JFK, a modern session-establishment protocol for IP security [9].
In recent work [4], we modelled JFK in the applied pi calculus. We used processes for representing the reachable
states of JFK, for any number of principals and sessions, and stated security properties as equivalences. Although we
relied on ProVerif for reasoning about behaviors, our main proofs of equivalences were manual. Applying the techniques
of this paper, we can revise and largely automate those proofs. The resulting proofs rely on equivalences on biprocesses,
verified by ProVerif, composed with standard pi calculus equivalences that do not depend on the signature for terms.
In particular, a core property of JFK is that, once a session completes, its session key is (apparently) unrelated to the
cryptographic material exchanged during the session, and all those values can be replaced by distinct fresh names [4,
Theorem 2]. This property can be stated and proved in terms of a biprocess S that outputs either the actual results of
JFK computations (in fst(S)) or distinct fresh names (in snd(S)), in parallel with the rest of the JFK system to account
for any other sessions. The proof of this property goes as follows. The JFK system is split into S ≈ C[S′], where S′
is similar to S but omits unimportant parts of JFK, collected in the evaluation context C[_]. The proof that S ≈ C[S′]
is straightforward; it relies on pi calculus equivalences that eliminate communications on private channels introduced
in the split. ProVerif shows that S′ satisfies equivalence. Using the contextual property of equivalence, C[S′] satisfies
equivalence, hence fst(S) ≈ snd(S).
10. Conclusion
In the last decade, there has been substantial research on proof methods for security protocols. While many of
those proof methods have focused on predicates on behaviors, others have addressed equivalences between systems
(e.g., [1,6,7,8,23,24,25,29,33,34,38,39,46]). Much of this research is concerned with obtaining sound and complete
proof systems, often via sophisticated bisimulations, and eventually decision algorithms for restricted cases. In our
opinion, these are important goals, and the results to date are significant.
In the present paper, we aim to contribute to this body of research with a different approach. We do not emphasize
the development of bisimulation techniques. Rather, we leverage behavior-oriented techniques and tools (ProVerif, in
particular) for equivalence proofs. We show how to derive equivalences by reasoning about behaviors—specifically,
by reasoning about behaviors of applied pi calculus biprocesses. We also show how to translate those biprocesses to
Horn clauses and how to reason about their behaviors by resolution. The resulting proof method is sound, although
that is not simple to establish. We demonstrate the usefulness of the method through automated analyses of interesting,
infinite-state systems.
Acknowledgments
Bruno Blanchet’s work was partly done at Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken. Martín Abadi’s work
was partly supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants CCR-0204162, CCR-0208800, and CCF-
0524078. We are grateful to Harald Ganzinger for helpful discussions on the treatment of equational theories.
Appendix
The Appendix contains proofs of the main results of this paper. Proof scripts for all examples and applications, as
well as the tool ProVerif, are available at http://www.di.ens.fr/∼blanchet/obsequi/.
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A. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we prove the correctness of Algorithms 1–3 given in Section 5.3. We begin with preliminary lemmas
on modelling equational theories.
A.1. Preliminary lemmas
Lemma 4. Let N be either a name or a variable. If   M = N and nfS,({M}), then M = N . For any set of terms
M, if nfS,(M), then nfS,(M ∪ {N}).
Proof. We detail the proof for N = a.
If we had M /= a, then either M contains a, so M does not satisfy nfS,({M}), or M does not contain a. In this
latter case, since  is invariant by substitution of terms for names, for all M ′, we have   a{M ′/a} = M{M ′/a} so
  M ′ = M , then all terms are equated by , which contradicts the hypothesis.
Let M ′′ be any subterm of an element of M. We have nfS,({M ′′}), so if   M ′′ = a, then M ′′ = a, by the
previous property. Moreover, a is irreducible by S. So we have nfS,(M ∪ {a}). 
Lemma 5. Assume S = ∅ and  is any equational theory. Then Property S2 is true.
Proof. We show the following property: If nfS,(M), then for any term M there exists M ′ such that   M ′ = M
and nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}).
The proof is by induction on M .
• Cases M = a and M = x: Let M ′ = M; by Lemma 4, nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}).
• Case M = f (N1, . . . , Nn): By induction hypothesis, there exist N ′1, . . . , N ′n such that   Ni = N ′i and
nfS,(M ∪ {N ′1, . . . , N ′n}). (For Ni , we apply the induction hypothesis with M ∪ {N ′1, . . . , N ′i−1} instead of
M.)
If there exists a subterm M ′ of M ∪ {N ′1, . . . , N ′n} such that   f (N1, . . . , Nn) = M ′, then we have
nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}).
Otherwise, let M ′ = f (N ′1, . . . , N ′n). We have   M ′ = f (N1, . . . , Nn), and nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}) since the sub-
terms of M ∪ {M ′} are the subterms of M ∪ {N ′1, . . . , N ′n} and the term M ′, nfS,(M ∪ {N ′1, . . . , N ′n}) and the
new subterm M ′ is different from any subterm of M ∪ {N ′1, . . . , N ′n} modulo the equational theory of . 
A.2. Convergent theories
Lemma 6. The signature ′ built by Algorithm 1 models .
Proof. Properties S1 and S3 are obvious.
Let us prove Property S2. Assume that nfS,(M). Let M ′ = M↓. Then   M = M ′ and M ′ is irreducible by S.
Let N1 and N2 be two subterms of M ∪ {M ′} such that   N1 = N2, that is, N1↓ = N2↓. Moreover, N1 and N2 are
in normal form relatively to S, so N1 = N2. Hence nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}).
Finally, we prove Property S4. When M = f (M1, . . . ,Mn), we let M↓s = f (M1↓, . . . ,Mn↓) be the term
obtained by reducing to normal form the strict subterms of M . We first note a few elementary properties of the
algorithm:
P1. If N → N ′ is in S, then there is N1 → N ′1 in E such that T [σN1] = N↓s and T [σN ′1] = N ′↓ for some σ and
T . (This is true at the beginning of an execution of the algorithm, and remains true during the execution, since
a rule N1 → N ′1 is removed from E only when there is another rule N2 → N ′2 such that N1 = T [σN2] and
N ′1 = T [σN ′2] for some σ and T .)
P2. If N is reducible by a rule in E, then it is also reducible by a rule in S. (This is true at the beginning of an
execution of the algorithm and remains true during the execution.)
P3. If N → N ′ is in E, then N is not a variable, and all variables of N ′ occur in N . (This is true at the beginning of
an execution of the algorithm and remains true during the execution.)
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P4. At the end of the algorithm, if N1 → N ′1 and N2 → N ′2 in E are such that N ′1 = T [N ′′1 ], N ′′1 is not a variable,
and σu is the most general unifier of N ′′1 and N2, then there exist N3 → N ′3 in E, T ′, and σ such that T ′[σN3] =
(σuN1)↓s and T ′[σN ′3] = σuT [σuN ′2]↓. (This simply expresses that the fixpoint is reached: the rule (σuN1)↓s→ σuT [σuN ′2]↓ has been added to E.)
We show the following two properties, P5(n) for n > 0 and P6(n) for n ≥ 0:
P5(n). If the longest reduction of M by S is of length n and M = M↓s , then there exist N → N ′ in E and σ such that
M = σN and M↓ = σN ′.
P6(n). If the longest reduction of σN ′1 by S is of length n, M = σN1 →∗S σN ′1, M = M↓s , and N1 → N ′1 is in E,
then there exist N2 → N ′2 in E and σ ′ such that M = σ ′N2 →∗S σ ′N ′2 = M↓.
The proof is by induction on n.
• Proof of P5(n) (n > 0).
Since M = M↓s , the strict subterms of M are irreducible, so the first application of a rewrite rule in any reduction of
M must touch the root function symbol of M . Let N → N ′ be this rewrite rule. There exists σ1 such that M = σ1N .
Since N → N ′ is in S, by P1, there is N1 → N ′1 in E such that T [σ2N1] = N↓s and T [σ2N ′1] = N ′↓ for some
σ2 and T . Since the strict subterms of σ1N are irreducible by S, the strict subterms of N are also irreducible by S,
hence N↓s = N . Furthermore, T = [ ], since otherwise a strict subterm of N would be reducible by N1 → N ′1 in E,
so using P2, it would also be reducible by S. Hence σ1σ2N1 = σ1N = M and σ1σ2N ′1 = σ1(N ′↓). Let σ = σ1σ2.
Then M = σN1 →+S σN ′1.
By P6(n′) where n′ is the length of the longest reduction of σN ′1 (n′ < n), there exist N2 → N ′2 in E and σ ′ such
that M = σ ′N2 →∗S σ ′N ′2 = M↓, which is P5(n).• Proof of P6(n), n = 0, σN ′1 is irreducible by S. Then σN ′1 = M↓ and we have P6(0) by taking σ ′ = σ , N2 = N1,
and N ′2 = N ′1.• Proof of P6(n), n > 0, σN ′1 is reducible by S.
Let us consider a minimal subterm of σN ′1 which is reducible by S, that is, a subterm of σN ′1 reducible by S but
such that all its strict subterms are irreducible by S. Such a term is of the form σN ′3, where N ′3 is a non-variable
subterm of N ′1. (Indeed, all terms σx and their subterms are irreducible by S, since they are strict subterms of M
and M = M↓s .)
The longest reduction of σN ′3 is at most as long as the one of σN ′1, so by P5, there exist N4 → N ′4 in E and σ ′′
such that σN ′3 = σ ′′N4 and (σN ′3)↓ = σ ′′N ′4. Thus we have M = σN1 →∗S σN ′1 = σT [σN ′3] = σT [σ ′′N4] →+S
σT [σ ′′N ′4] = σT [(σN ′3)↓].
The rewrite rules N1 → N ′1 and N4 → N ′4 have a critical pair, that is, N ′1 = T [N ′3], N ′3 is not a variable, and N ′3
and N4 unify, with most general unifier σu. By P4, there is N5 → N ′5 in E such that T ′[σ5N5] = (σuN1)↓s and
T ′[σ5N ′5] = σuT [σuN ′4]↓ for some T ′ and σ5. Moreover, σuN1 is more general than σN1, so the strict subterms
of σuN1 are irreducible, since the strict subterms of σN1 are. So (σuN1)↓s = σuN1. Furthermore T ′ = [ ], since
otherwise a strict subterm of σuN1 would be reducible by E, so using P2, it would also be reducible by S. Hence
σ5N5 = σuN1 and σ5N ′5 = σuT [σuN ′4]↓.
Then M = σ1N5 →∗S σ1N ′5 for some σ1. Moreover, σN ′1 = σT [σ ′′N4] →+S σT [σ ′′N ′4] →∗S σ1N ′5, so the longest
reduction of σ1N ′5 is strictly shorter than the longest reduction of σN
′
1, hence by P6 applied to σ1N
′
5, there exist σ
′
and N2 → N ′2 in E such that M = σ ′N2 →∗S σ ′N ′2 = M↓. This yields P6 for σN ′1.
We now turn to the proof of Property S4 itself. Assume   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M and nfS,({M,M1, . . . ,Mn}).
We show that there exist f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def′(f ) and σ such that M = σN and Mi = σNi . Since M is
irreducible, we have M = f (M1, . . . ,Mn)↓.
• If f (M1, . . . ,Mn) is irreducible by S, then f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M and we have the result using the rule
f (x1, . . . , xn) → f (x1, . . . , xn) always in def′(f ).
• Otherwise, we have f (M1, . . . ,Mn)↓s = f (M1, . . . ,Mn) since Mi is irreducible for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Prop-
erty P5 for the term f (M1, . . . ,Mn) yields the desired result, since every rule f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N ′ of E is in
def′(f ). 
We say that S is a convergent subterm system when S is convergent and all its rewrite rules are of the form M → N
where N is either a strict subterm of M or a closed term in normal form with respect to S [5,12].
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Lemma 7. When S is a convergent subterm rewriting system, Algorithm 1 terminates and the final value of E is
normalize(S).
Proof. LetS be a convergent subterm system, with  the associated equational theory. Let E1 be obtained by replacing
each rule f (M1, . . . ,Mn) → N of S with f (M1↓, . . . ,Mn↓) → N↓ and removing rules of the form M → M . Let
E2 = normalize(S). We first show:
P1. if M /= N ,   M = N , and N and the strict subterms of M are in normal form, then there exist M1 → N1 in
E2 and σ such that M = σM1 and N = σN1.
Since   M = N , we have M↓ = N↓. The term N is in normal form, so M↓ = N , so M →∗S N . Since M /= N ,
M →S M ′ →∗S N . Since the strict subterms of M are in normal form, there are a rewrite rule M1 → M ′1 of S and a
substitution σ such that M = σM1 and M ′ = σM ′1. If M ′1 is a strict subterm of M1, M ′ is a strict subterm of M , so
M ′ is in normal form, hence M ′ = N . If M ′1 is a closed term in normal form, M ′ = M ′1 is in normal form, so we also
have M ′ = N .
Moreover, M ′1 and the strict subterms of M1 are in normal form since M ′ and the strict subterms of M are. So the
rewrite rule M1 → N1 is preserved by the transformation of S into E1, so M1 → N1 is in E1. Finally, if M1 → N1
is removed when transforming E1 into E2, there are another rule M ′1 → N ′1 in E2 and a substitution σ ′ such that
M1 = σ ′M ′1 and N1 = σ ′N ′1, so Property P1 holds in any case.
Let M0 → N0 be a rewrite rule added by Algorithm 1. We show that E2 = normalize(E2 ∪ {M0 → N0}).
Let E3 be obtained by replacing each rule f (M1, . . . ,Mn) → N of E2 ∪ {M0 → N0} with f (M1↓, . . . ,Mn↓) →
N↓ and removing rules of the form M → M . Since E2 has already been normalized, when we transform E2 ∪
{M0 → N0} into E3, only M0 → N0 is transformed, into a rule M → N . If M = N , the rule M → N is removed,
so we immediately have E2 = normalize(E2 ∪ {M0 → N0}). Otherwise, by Property P1, there exist M1 → N1
in E2 (so in E3) and σ such that M = σM1 and N = σN1. Hence M0 → N0 is removed by the last step of
normalize, so E2 = normalize(E2 ∪ {M0 → N0}). We conclude that the fixpoint is reached before iterating, and it
is E2. 
A.3. Linear theories
Lemma 8. The signature ′ built by Algorithm 2 models .
Proof. Property S1 is obvious. Property S2 follows from Lemma 5. Property S3 follows from the invariant that, if
M → M ′ is in E, then   M = M ′. Next, we prove Property S4. We first note a few elementary properties of the
algorithm:
P1. If N = N ′ or N ′ = N is an equation of , then there is N1 → N ′1 in E such that T [σN1] = N and T [σN ′1] = N ′
for some σ and T . (This is true at the beginning of an execution of the algorithm, and remains true during the
execution, since a rule N1 → N ′1 is removed from E only when there is another rule N2 → N ′2 in E such that
N1 = T [σN2] and N ′1 = T [σN ′2] for some σ and T .)
P2. At the end of the algorithm, if N1 → N ′1 and N2 → N ′2 in E are such that N ′1 = T [N ′′1 ], N ′′1 and N2 are not
variables, and σu is the most general unifier of N ′′1 and N2, then there exist N3 → N ′3 in E, T ′, and σ such
that T ′[σN3] = σuN1 and T ′[σN ′3] = σuT [σuN ′2]. (This simply expresses that the fixpoint is reached: the rule
(σuN1) → σuT [σuN ′2] has been added to E.)
Similarly, if N1 → N ′1 and N2 → N ′2 in E are such that N2 = T [N ′′2 ], N ′1 and N ′′2 are not variables, and σu is the
most general unifier of N ′1 and N ′′2 , then there exist N3 → N ′3 in E, T ′, and σ such that T ′[σN3] = σuT [σuN1]
and T ′[σN ′3] = σuN ′2.
Let us now prove a few more properties:
P3. For all M,M ′, if   M = M ′ then M →∗E M ′.
Assume that   M = M ′ comes from one equation of . Then there are N = N ′ in , T , and σ such that
M = T [σN ] and M ′ = T [σN ′]. Hence, by P1, there are N1 → N ′1 in E, T ′, and σ ′ such that N = T ′[σ ′N1] and
N ′ = T ′[σ ′N ′1]. So M = T [(σT ′)[σσ ′N1]] →E T [(σT ′)[σσ ′N ′1]] = M ′. The property stated above follows
immediately.
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P4. If M1 →E M2 →E M3 using two rules M → N and M ′ → N ′ of E such that neither N nor M ′ are variables,
M1 = T1[σ1M], M2 = T1[σ1N ] = T2[σ2M ′], and M3 = T2[σ2N ′] for some contexts T1 and T2 and substitutions
σ1 and σ2, then
• either M1 →E M3 in a single step;
• or the rules commute: M1 →E M ′2 →E M3 where M1 →E M ′2 comes from M ′ → N ′ and M ′2 →E M3 comes
from M → N .
We prove the property by case analysis on T1 and T2:
(1) The occurrences of the holes of T1 and T2 are not nested: there exists T ′′ such that T1 = T ′′[[ ], σ2M ′]
and T2 = T ′′[σ1N, [ ]]. So M1 = T ′′[σ1M,σ2M ′], M2 = T ′′[σ1N, σ2M ′], and M3 = T ′′[σ1N, σ2N ′]. Then the
rules commute: M1 = T ′′[σ1M,σ2M ′] →E M ′2 = T ′′[σ1M,σ2N ′] →E M3 = T ′′[σ1N, σ2N ′].
(2) The occurrence of the hole of T1 is inside the one of T2: T1 = T2[T ′]. We distinguish two subcases:
(2a) T ′ is an instance of M ′: T ′ = σ3M ′. So we have M1 = T2[(σ3M ′)[σ1M]], M2 = T2[(σ3M ′)[σ1N ]], and
M3 = T2[(σ3N ′)[σ1N ]]. The linearity of N ′ guarantees that σ3N ′ contains at most one hole, since σ3M ′ contains
one hole.
If σ3N ′ contains no hole (that is, the variable x of M ′ such that σ3x contains a hole does not occur in N ′), then
M1 = T2[(σ3M ′)[σ1M]] →E M3 = T2[(σ3N ′)] by M ′ →E N ′.
Ifσ3N ′ contains exactly one hole, the rules commute:M1 = T2[(σ3M ′)[σ1M]] →E M ′2 = T2[(σ3N ′)[σ1M]] →E
M3 = T2[(σ3N ′)[σ1N ]].
(2b) T ′ is not an instance of M ′. Since T ′[σ1N ] = σ2M ′ and M ′ is linear, the hole of T ′ occurs at a non-variable
position in M ′, so N and M ′ form a critical pair and, by Property P2, E contains a rule that corresponds to the
application of both rewrite rules M → N and M ′ → N ′.
(3) The occurrence of the hole of T2 is inside the one of T1: T2 = T1[T ′]. The proof is similar to the one for
case (2).
Let   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M with nfS,({M,M1, . . . ,Mn}). We show that there exist f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N in
def′(f ) and σ such that M = σN and Mi = σNi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M , we have f (M1, . . . ,Mn) →∗E M by P3. Consider a shortest sequence such that
f (M1, . . . ,Mn) →∗E M .• In this sequence, consecutive rewrite rules always commute, because otherwise we would obtain a shorter sequence
by P4.
• If this sequence uses a rule x → M ′ in E, consider the last such rule. It commutes with the rule that immediately
follows. So we obtain a sequence in which x → M ′ is applied last. This is impossible since nfS,({M}). From now
on, we consider a sequence that does not use any rewrite rule of the form x → M ′.
• If this sequence uses no rewrite rule applied with empty context, then M = f (M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) and Mi →∗E M ′i ,
so   Mi = M ′i . Since nfS,({M1, . . . ,Mn,M}), Mi = M ′i , so M = f (M1, . . . ,Mn). Then f (x1, . . . , xn) →
f (x1, . . . , xn) in def′(f ) and σxi = Mi yields the desired result.
• If this sequence uses at least one rewrite rule applied with empty context, let f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N be the first such
rule.
If the sequence uses a rule M ′ → x in E before f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N , then this rule is applied with non-empty
context (because otherwise f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N would not be the first rule with empty context). Consider the first
such rule. This rule commutes with the rule just before it. Moreover, after commutation, M ′ → x is still applied
with non-empty context. (The only case that would make the context disappear is when the rewrite rule before was
y → M ′′, but this case cannot occur as shown above.) So we obtain a sequence in which M ′ → x is applied first,
and with non-empty context. This is impossible since nfS,({M1, . . . ,Mn}). So we consider a sequence not using
rules of the form M ′ → x before f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N .
The rule f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N commutes with the rule just before it. The rule f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N is still applied
with an empty context after commutation. So we can obtain a sequence in which f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N is applied
first. All rewrite rules after the first one are applied with a context that is an instance of N (because otherwise
N is not a variable and the first rule applied with a context that is not an instance of N can be commuted with
other rewrite rules so that it occurs just after f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N , so it has a critical pair with f (N1, . . . , Nn) →
N , so we could obtain a shorter sequence by P2). So M = σ ′N for some σ ′. Furthermore f (M1, . . . ,Mn) =
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f (σN1, . . . , σNn) →E σN →∗E M = σ ′N for some σ . Then for all x ∈ fv(N), σx →∗E σ ′x, so for all x ∈ fv(N),
  σx = σ ′x. Moreover, nfS,(M1, . . . ,Mn,M), so σx = σ ′x, and M = σN , which yields the result. 
A.4. Union of disjoint equational theories
Let  be a signature such that its set of function symbols can be partitioned into F1 ∪ F2 and its set of equations
can be partitioned into E′1 ∪ E′2, where E′1 contains only function symbols in F1 and E′2 in F2. Let 1 be the signature
obtained by considering only the equations E′1, and 2 only the equations E′2.
Lemma 9. If   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M , nf∅,({M,M1, . . . ,Mn}), and f ∈ Fi (i = 1 or 2) then i  f (M1,
. . . ,Mn) = M .
Proof. To prove this result, we use the decision algorithm for the word problem in a union of disjoint equational
theories, by Baader and Tinelli [11, Section 4]. We use the notations of [11], and we refer the reader to that paper for
details.
Assume i = 1. (The case i = 2 is symmetric.) Let us start with S0 = {x0 ≡ y0, x0 ≡ f (M1, . . . ,Mn), y0 ≡ M}.
Since   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M , by completeness of their algorithm, their algorithm terminates with S = {v ≡ v} ∪
T .
Let S be a set of equations and disequations, such that all equations of S are of the form v ≡ M , if v ≡ M and
v ≡ N are in S then M = N , and ≺ is acyclic on S. Let us define a substitution σ by σv = M when (v ≡ M) ∈ S.
Since ≺ is acyclic on S, we can define σ ∗ as the substitution obtained by composing σ with itself as many times as
needed so that terms do not change any more. Let recS(v) = σ ∗v.
If we apply the rules of the algorithm according to a suitable strategy (made explicit below), we can show that the
algorithm preserves the following invariant:
P1. There is no equation v ≡ M ′ in Sj such that (v ≡ M ′) ≺ (x0 ≡ M ′′).
P2. If j > 0, then for all v /= x0 such that v occurs in Sj−1 and Sj , we have recSj−1(v) = recSj (v).
P3. For all v /= x0 such that v occurs in Sj , recSj (v) is a subterm of M1, . . . ,Mn,M (so if v, v′ /= x0 occur in Sj
and   recSj (v) = recSj (v′), then recSj (v) = recSj (v′), since nf∅,({M,M1, . . . ,Mn})).
P4. If j > 0 and x0 ≡ M ′′ ∈ Sj , then 1  recSj−1(x0) = recSj (x0).
P5. When x0 ≡ M ′′ ∈ Sj , M ′′ is a non-variable 1-term.
P6. If j > 0, u ≡ u′ ∈ Sj−1, and v ≡ v′ ∈ Sj , then 1  recSj−1(u) = recSj (v) and 1  recSj−1(u′) = recSj (v′).
During the first stage (construction of the abstraction system), these properties are obvious. We even have recSj−1(v) =
recSj (v) for all v that occur in Sj−1, and the disequation x0 ≡ y0 is not changed.
During the second stage (application of Coll1, Coll2, Ident, Simpl), we do not apply Simpl since the authors remark
that it is not necessary. We show that if Sj−1 is transformed into Sj by Coll1, Coll2, or Ident, and Sj−1 satisfies the
invariant, then so does Sj .
• For Coll1 and Coll2 with x /= x0, i  y = t , so   recSj−1(x) = recSj−1(y), so by property P3, recSj−1(x) =
recSj−1(y), so y = t . Then for all v that occur in Sj , recSj−1(v) = recSj (v), so we have P2 and P4 for Sj . P3 holds
for Sj since P2 holds for Sj and P3 holds for Sj−1. We have recSj−1(x) = recSj−1(y) = recSj (y), so P6 follows. P1
and P5 are easy to show.
• For Coll1 with x = x0, 1  y = t , and T {r/x0} = T since x0 does not occur in the right-hand side of equalities
by P1. So for all v that occur in Sj (that is, all v that occur in Sj−1 except x0), recSj−1(v) = recSj (v), so we have
P2 for Sj ; P3 follows. P4 and P5 hold since Sj contains no equation of the form x0 ≡ M ′′. Since   y = t , we
have 1  recSj−1(x0) = recSj−1(y) = recSj (y), so P6 follows. P1 is easy to show.• For Coll2 with x = x0, 1  y = t , and T is replaced with T {y/x0}, which modifies only the disequation, since x0
does not occur in the right-hand side of equalities by P1. We conclude as in the previous case.
• For Ident, we never apply Ident with y = x0; when Ident would be applicable with y = x0, we apply instead Ident
with x = x0 (which is possible by P1).
If we apply Ident with x, y /= x0, then i  s = t , so   recSj−1(x) = recSj−1(y), so by Property P3, recSj−1(x) =
recSj−1(y), so s = t . Then, for all v that occur in Sj , recSj−1(v) = recSj (v), so we have P2 and P4; P3 follows. We
have recSj−1(x) = recSj−1(y) = recSj (y), so P6 follows. P1 and P5 are easy to show.
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If we apply Ident with x = x0, y /= x0, then 1  s = t . x0 does not occur in the right-hand side of equalities by P1.
So replacing x0 with y in T changes only the disequation. Then for all v that occur in Sj , recSj−1(v) = recSj (v),
so we have P2 and P4; P3 follows. Since 1  s = t , we have   recSj−1(x0) = recSj−1(y) = recSj (y), so P6
follows. P1 and P5 are easy to show.
Since, in the end, S contains v ≡ v, by P6, we have 1  recS0(x0) = recS(v) and 1  recS0(y0) = recS(v) which
implies 1  f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M . 
This result can be used to prove the correctness of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 10. The signature ′ built by Algorithm 3 models .
Proof. The set of function symbols of  can be partitioned into F1 ∪ F2, where Econv contains only function symbols
in F1 and Elin in F2. Let 1 be the signature obtained by considering only equations Econv, and 2 only Elin.
Because of the particular way in which we prove that subsets Ei are convergent, we have that their union Econv is
also convergent, so we can apply Algorithm 1 to Econv. (When we prove termination of each Ei via a lexicographic path
ordering, we order the function symbols of Ei . We order the function symbols of Econv by the union of these orderings.
Then the corresponding lexicographic path ordering shows the termination of Econv. The confluence of Econv follows
from the confluence of every Ei by the critical-pair theorem.)
Properties S1 and S3 are obvious. We prove Property S2 by induction on M:
• Cases M = a and M = x: Let M ′ = M; by Lemma 4, nfS,(M ∪ {M}).
• Case M = f (M1, . . . ,Mn): By induction hypothesis, there exist M ′1, . . . ,M ′n such that   Mi = M ′i and
nfS,(M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}). (For Mi , we apply the induction hypothesis with M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′i−1} instead of
M.)
Case 1: there exists a subterm M ′ of M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n} such that   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M ′. Then M ′ is
irreducible by S and nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}), so we have the result.
Case 2: there exists no subterm M ′′ of M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n} such that   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M ′′.
Case 2.1: Assume f ∈ F2. Let M ′ = f (M ′1, . . . ,M ′n). We have   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M ′. Moreover, M ′ is
irreducible by S since M ′1, . . . ,M ′n are, f ∈ F2, and no rewrite rule of S contains a function symbol in F2 or
a variable in the left-hand side. Then nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}) since the subterms of M ∪ {M ′} are the subterms of
M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n} and the term M ′, nfS,(M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}), and the new subterm M ′ is different from any
subterms of M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n} modulo the equational theory of .
Case 2.2: Assume f ∈ F1. Let M ′ = f (M ′1, . . . ,M ′n)↓. We have   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M ′. Moreover, M ′ is
irreducible by S by definition. If nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}) was wrong, there would exist N and N ′ subterms of M ∪ {M ′}
such that   N = N ′ and N /= N ′. Let us choose such terms N and N ′ such that the pair (max(size(N), size(N ′)),
min(size(N), size(N ′))) ordered lexicographically is minimal. When size(N) < size(N ′), we swap N and N ′,
so that we always have size(N) ≥ size(N ′). Let N = f ′(N1, . . . , Nn′). We have nfS,(N1, . . . , Nn′ , N ′). (If
nfS,(N1, . . . , Nn′ , N ′) was not true, considering subterms of N1, . . . , Nn′ , N ′ that falsify nfS,(N1, . . . , Nn′ ,
N ′) would yield a smaller counterexample.)
Notice that nfS,(N1, . . . , Nn′ , N ′) implies nf∅,(N1, . . . , Nn′ , N ′), so we can apply Lemma 9.
If f ′ ∈ F1, then 1  f ′(N1, . . . , Nn′) = N ′ by Lemma 9. Hence f ′(N1, . . . , Nn′)↓ = N ′↓. The terms N ′ and
f ′(N1, . . . , Nn′) are subterms of M ∪ {M ′}, so they are irreducible by S, so f ′(N1, . . . , Nn′) = N ′. Hence, we
have a contradiction.
If f ′ ∈ F2, then2  f ′(N1, . . . , Nn′) = N ′ by Lemma 9. Since the reduction of f (M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) intoM ′ modifies
only the top-level context of M ′ within F1, all subterms of M ∪ {M ′} with root symbol in F2 are also subterms
of M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}, so they satisfy nfS, . So the root symbol of N ′ is in F1. Let N ′ = f ′′(N ′1, . . . , N ′n′′),
f ′′ ∈ F1. If nfS,(N ′1, . . . , N ′n′′ , N), we can apply the case f ′ ∈ F1 above to   f ′′(N ′1, . . . , N ′n′′) = N . Oth-
erwise, the counterexample to nfS,(N ′1, . . . , N ′n′′ , N) is not smaller than   N = N ′ since it is minimal, and
size(N) ≥ size(N ′), so the counterexample to nfS,(N ′1, . . . , N ′n′′ , N) consists of two subterms of N ; this situation
is impossible since N = f ′(N1, . . . , Nn′) is a subterm of M ∪ {M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}, so all its subterms satisfy nfS, .
Hence we have nfS,(M ∪ {M ′}).
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Finally, we prove Property S4. Let   f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M with nfS,({M,M1, . . . ,Mn}). If f ∈ Fi (i = 1, 2),
then i  f (M1, . . . ,Mn) = M by Lemma 9 (since nfS,(M′) implies nf∅,(M′)). If i = 1, we conclude by
Property S4 for Algorithm 1. If i = 2, we conclude by Property S4 for Algorithm 2. 
B. Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
From this point on, we assume that ′ models . We say that a term or a term evaluation is plain when it does not
contain diff.
B.1. Preliminary lemmas
The following lemma shows the soundness of D′ ⇓′ (M ′, σ ′) with respect to D ⇓′ M .
Lemma 11. Let σ be a closed substitution.
LetD be a plain term evaluation. If σD ⇓′ M, then there existM ′, σ1, and σ ′1 such thatD ⇓′ (M ′, σ1),M = σ ′1M ′,
and σ = σ ′1σ1 except on fresh variables introduced in the computation of D ⇓′ (M ′, σ1).
Let D1, . . . , Dn be plain term evaluations. If for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σDi ⇓′ Mi, then there exist M ′1, . . . ,M ′n,
σ1, and σ ′1 such that (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n), σ1), Mi = σ ′1M ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and σ = σ ′1σ1 except
on fresh variables introduced in the computation of (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n), σ1).
Proof. The proof is by mutual induction following the definition of ⇓′.
• Case D = M ′: Take σ1 = ∅, σ ′1 = σ . Since M = σM ′, we have the result.• Case D = eval h(D1, . . . , Dn): Since eval h(σD1, . . . , σDn)⇓′ M , there exist h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def′(h)
and σm such that σDi ⇓′ σmNi and M = σmN .
By induction hypothesis, there exist M ′i , σ1, and σ ′1 such that (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n), σ1), σmNi = σ ′1M ′i
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and σ = σ ′1σ1 except on fresh variables introduced in the computation of (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′
((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n), σ1).
Let σu be the most general unifier of M ′i and Ni for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (The substitution σu exists since σmNi = σ ′1M ′i .)
Then eval h(D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ (σuN, σuσ1). The substitution that maps variables of Ni,N as σm and other variables
as σ ′1 is a unifier of M ′i and Ni , so there exists σ ′′1 such that σm = σ ′′1 σu on variables of Ni,N , and σ ′1 = σ ′′1 σu on
other variables.
Then σ ′′1 σuN = σmN = M and σ ′′1 σuσ1 = σ ′1σ1 = σ except on fresh variables introduced in the computation of
(D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n), σ1) and variables of N1, . . . , Nn,N , that is, fresh variables introduced in the
computation of D ⇓′ (σuN, σuσ1).
• Case (D1, . . . , Dn): We have, for all i in {1, . . . , n}, σDi ⇓′ Mi .
By induction hypothesis, there exist M ′i , σ1, and σ ′1 such that (D1, . . . , Dn−1) ⇓′ ((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n−1), σ1), Mi =
σ ′1M ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, and σ = σ ′1σ1 except on fresh variables introduced in the computation of
(D1, . . . , Dn−1) ⇓′ ((M ′1, . . . ,M ′n−1), σ1).
Then σDn = σ ′1σ1Dn, so σ ′1(σ1Dn)⇓′ Mn. So by induction hypothesis, there exist M ′n, σ2, and σ ′2 such that
σ1Dn ⇓′ (M ′n, σ2), Mn = σ ′2M ′n, and σ ′1 = σ ′2σ2 except on fresh variables introduced in the computation of σ1Dn ⇓′
(M ′n, σ2).
Hence (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((σ2M ′1, . . . , σ2M ′n−1,M ′n), σ2σ1), Mi = σ ′1M ′i = σ ′2(σ2M ′i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1},
Mn = σ ′2M ′n, and σ = σ ′1σ1 = σ ′2σ2σ1 except on fresh variables introduced in the computation of (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′
((σ2M
′
1, . . . , σ2M
′
n−1,M ′n), σ2σ1). 
Lemma 12. Letσ be a closed substitution andM a plain term. If  M ′ = σM and nfS,({M ′} ∪ {σx | x ∈ fv(M)})
then σaddeval(M)⇓′ M ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on M .
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• Case M = x: We have   σx = σM = M ′. Since nfS,({σx,M ′}), σx = M ′. Moreover, σaddeval(M) =
σx ⇓′ σx = M ′.
• Case M = a: Since   M ′ = σM and nfS,({M ′}), we have M ′ = a by Lemma 4, so σaddeval(M) = a ⇓′ a =
M ′.
• CaseM = f (M1, . . . ,Mn): We have  M ′ = σM = f (σM1, . . . , σMn) and nfS,({M ′} ∪ {σx | x ∈ fv(M)}).
By Property S2, there exist M ′1, . . . ,M ′n such that   σMi = M ′i and nfS,({M ′,M ′1, . . . ,M ′n} ∪ {σx | x ∈fv(M)}). By Property S4, there exist f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def′(f ) and σ ′ such that M ′ = σ ′N and σ ′Ni = M ′i
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By induction hypothesis, σaddeval(Mi)⇓′ M ′i = σ ′Ni for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By definition
of ⇓′ , σaddeval(M) = eval f (σaddeval(M1), . . . , σaddeval(Mn))⇓′ σ ′N = M ′. 
The following lemma shows the soundness of the rewrite rules of h in ′ with respect to these rewrite rules in .
When h is a destructor, this is proved using the previous two lemmas, and when h is a constructor, this follows from
the definition of “′ models ”. Lemma 14 extends this result to a term evaluation D by induction on D.
Lemma 13. If h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N is in def(h),   Mi = σNi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},   M = σN , and
nfS,({M1, . . . ,Mn,M}), then there exist h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def′(h) and σ ′ such that Mi = σ ′N ′i for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and M = σ ′N ′.
Proof. Case 1: h is a constructor in . We have   M = h(M1, . . . ,Mn). The result follows from Property S4.
Case 2:h is a destructor in. By Property S2, there exists σ0 such that  σ0x = σx for all x ∈ fv(N1, . . . , Nn,N)
and nfS,({M1, . . . ,Mn,M} ∪ {σ0x | x ∈ fv(N1, . . . , Nn,N)}). So   M = σ0N and   Mi = σ0Ni for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 12, σ0addeval(N)⇓′ M and σ0addeval(Ni)⇓′ Mi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 11,
there exist N ′1, . . . , N ′n, N ′, σ1, and σ ′ such that addeval(N1, . . . , Nn,N) ⇓′ ((N ′1, . . . , N ′n,N ′), σ1), σ ′N ′i = Mi for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and σ ′N ′ = M . Then h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ is in def′(h), σ ′N ′i = Mi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
σ ′N ′ = M . 
Lemma 14. Let D be a plain term evaluation. If D ⇓ M,   M ′ = M,   D′ = D, and nfS,({M ′,D′}), then
D′ ⇓′ M ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on D.
• Case D = M: We have M ⇓ M , so   D′ = D = M = M ′ and nfS,({M ′,D′}) so D′ = M ′, and D′ ⇓′ M ′.
• Case D = eval h(D1, . . . , Dn): Since D ⇓ M , we have that h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N is in def(h), Di ⇓ Mi
and   σNi = Mi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and σN = M . So   σN = M ′. Since   D′ = D, we have D′ =
eval h(D′1, . . . , D′n), with   D′i = Di for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Property S2, there exist M ′1, . . . ,M ′n such that
  Mi = M ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and nfS,({M ′,D′,M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}). By induction hypothesis, D′i ⇓′ M ′i for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 13, there exist h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def′(h) and σ ′ such that M ′ = σ ′N ′ and
σ ′N ′i = M ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then D′ ⇓′ σ ′N ′ = M ′. 
We define the function removeeval such that removeeval(D) = M where D is a term evaluation that contains no
destructor, and M is the term obtained by removing any eval before the function symbols of D.
Lemma 15. Assume that D is a plain term evaluation that contains no destructor. If D ⇓′ (M, σ) then  
σ removeeval(D) = M .
Assume that D1, . . . , Dn are plain term evaluations that contain no destructor. If (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′
((M1, . . . ,Mn), σ ) then   σ removeeval(Di) = Mi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. The proof is by mutual induction following the definition of ⇓′.
• Case D = M: We have σ = ∅, so   σM = M .
• Case D = eval f (D1, . . . , Dn): We have eval f (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ (σuN, σuσ) where (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′
((M1, . . . ,Mn), σ ), f is a constructor in , f (N1, . . . , Nn) → N is in def′(f ) (with new variables), and
σu is the most general unifier of (M1, N1), . . . , (Mn,Nn). Then by Property S3,   f (N1, . . . , Nn) = N .
By induction hypothesis,   σ removeeval(Di) = Mi . Moreover we have σuMi = σuNi . Hence we obtain  
B. Blanchet et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 75 (2008) 3–51 33
σuσ removeeval(eval f (D1, . . . , Dn)) = f (σuσ removeeval(D1), . . . , σuσ removeeval(Dn)) = f (σuM1, . . . ,
σuMn) = f (σuN1, . . . , σuNn) = σuN .
• Case (D1, . . . , Dn): We have (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((σ ′M1, . . . , σ ′Mn−1,Mn), σ ′σ) where (D1, . . . , Dn−1) ⇓′
((M1, . . . ,Mn−1), σ ) and σDn ⇓′ (Mn, σ ′). Then by induction hypothesis,   σ removeeval(Di) = Mi for i ∈
{1, . . . , n − 1} and   σ ′removeeval(σDn) = Mn. Hence,   σ ′σ removeeval(Di) = σ ′Mi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,
n − 1} and   σ ′σ removeeval(Dn) = Mn. 
The following two lemmas show a completeness property: we do not lose precision by translating computation in
 into computations in ′. The proof of Lemma 16 relies on Lemma 15 for destructor applications.
Lemma 16. If h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N is in def′(h) then there exists h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def(h) and σ such
that   Ni = σN ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and   N = σN ′.
Proof. Case 1: h is a constructor in . By Property S3,   h(N1, . . . , Nn) = N . Let σ be defined by σxi = Ni
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, N ′i = xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and N ′ = h(x1, . . . , xn). We have h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in
def(h) because h(x1, . . . , xn) → h(x1, . . . , xn) is in def(h). We also have   Ni = σN ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and   N = h(N1, . . . , Nn) = σN ′.
Case 2: h is a destructor in . Then there exists h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def(h), such that addeval(N ′1, . . . ,
N ′n,N ′) ⇓′ ((N1, . . . , Nn,N), σ ). By Lemma 15,   N = σN ′ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},   Ni = σN ′i . 
Lemma 17. Let D be a plain term evaluation. If   D′ = D and D′ ⇓′ M ′ then D ⇓ M for some M such that
  M = M ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on D.
• Case D = M: We have D ⇓ M . Moreover   D′ = D, so D′ is also a term, and M ′ = D′. Finally, D = M ,
D′ = M ′, and   D′ = D, so   M = M ′.
• Case D = eval h(D1, . . . , Dn): Since   D′ = D, we have D′ = eval h(D′1, . . . , D′n) with   D′i = Di . Since
D′ ⇓′ M ′, there exist h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def′(h) and σ such that M ′ = σN , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
D′i ⇓′ σNi . By induction hypothesis, Di ⇓ Mi with   Mi = σNi .
By Lemma 16, there exist h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def(h) and σ ′, such that   N = σ ′N ′ and for all i ∈{1, . . . , n},   Ni = σ ′N ′i . Then Di ⇓ Mi ,   Mi = σNi = σσ ′N ′i , and h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ is in def(h),
so D ⇓ σσ ′N ′. Moreover,   M ′ = σN = σσ ′N ′. 
The following lemma is useful to deal with rule (Red Fun 2): when D fails to evaluate, the lemma ensures that
D′ also fails to evaluate, even with the equational theory of . To this end, Lemma 18 requires D′ ⇓ M ′, whereas
Lemma 17 requires D′ ⇓′ M ′.
Lemma 18. Let D be a plain term evaluation. If   D′ = D and D′ ⇓ M ′ then D ⇓ M for some M such that
  M = M ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on D.
• Case D = M: We have D ⇓ M . Moreover   D′ = D, so D′ is also a term, and M ′ = D′. Finally, D = M ,
D′ = M ′, and   D′ = D, so   M = M ′.
• Case D = eval h(D1, . . . , Dn): Since   D′ = D, we have D′ = eval h(D′1, . . . , D′n) with   D′i = Di . Since
D′ ⇓ M ′, there exist h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def(h) and σ such that M ′ = σN , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
D′i ⇓ M ′i with   M ′i = σNi . By induction hypothesis, Di ⇓ Mi with   Mi = σNi . Then D =
eval h(D1, . . . , Dn)⇓ σN and   σN = M ′. 
B.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 is an obvious consequence of the following lemma.
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Lemma 19. Let P0 be a closed, unevaluated biprocess.
If P0 →∗≡ P ′0,   Q′0 = P ′0, and nfS,({Q′0}), then P0 →∗′,≡ Q′0 by a reduction whose intermediate
biprocesses Q all satisfy nfS,({Q}).
Conversely, if P0 →∗′,≡ Q′0 then there exists P ′0 such that   Q′0 = P ′0 and P0 →∗≡ P ′0.
Proof. We write VC(P ) when P is a closed process whose terms M are either variables or terms of the form
diff[M1,M2] where M1 and M2 are closed terms that do not contain diff. (Function symbols prefixed by eval are not
constrained.) We have the following properties:
P1. If VC(P ) and P ≡ P ′ then VC(P ′). The proof is by induction on the derivation of P ≡ P ′. All cases are easy,
since ≡ cannot change terms.
P2. If VC(P ) and P → P ′ then VC(P ′). The proof is by induction on the derivation of P → P ′. The only change
of terms is done by the substitution {M/x} in the rules (Red I/O) and (Red Fun 1). This substitution replaces a
variable with a closed term M = diff[M1,M2], hence the result. (For (Red I/O), M is of the form diff[M1,M2]
because of VC(P ).)
P3. If VC(P {diff[M1,M2]/x}),   P {diff[M1,M2]/x} = P ′′, and nfS,(P ∪ {P ′′}), then there exist P ′, M ′1, and
M ′2 such that   P = P ′,   M1 = M ′1,   M2 = M ′2, P ′′ = P ′{diff[M ′1,M ′2]/x}, and nfS,(P ∪ {P ′,
M ′1,M ′2}).
Since P0 is closed and unevaluated, VC(P0). Therefore, by P1 and P2, if P0 →∗≡ P , then VC(P ). Moreover, the
only process P such that   P0 = P and nfS,({P }) is P0 by Lemma 4.
Let us show that, if P ≡ P ′,   Q′ = P ′, and nfS,(P ∪ {Q′}), then there exists Q such that   Q = P ,
nfS,(P ∪ {Q}), and Q ≡ Q′. The proof is by induction on the derivation of P ≡ P ′. All cases are easy, since ≡ does
not depend on terms.
Let us show that, if VC(P ), P → P ′,   Q′ = P ′, and nfS,(P ∪ {Q′}), then there exists Q such that  
Q = P , nfS,(P ∪ {Q}), and Q →′, Q′. The proof is by induction on the derivation of P → P ′.
• Case (Red I/O): Since VC(P ), we have P = diff[M1,M2]〈N〉.R | diff[M ′1,M ′2](x).R′ → R | R′{N/x} = P ′ with
  M1 = M ′1 and   M2 = M ′2. Since   Q′ = P ′ and nfS,(P ∪ {Q′}), we have Q′ = R1 | R′1{N1/x} for
some R1, R
′
1, N1 such that   R1 = R,   R′1 = R′,   N1 = N , and nfS,(P ∪ {R1, R′1, N1}) by P3.
By Property S2, there exist M ′′1 and M ′′2 such that   M ′′1 = M1 = M ′1,   M ′′2 = M2 = M ′2, and nfS,(P ∪{R1, R′1, N1,M ′′1 ,M ′′2 }).
We let Q = diff[M ′′1 ,M ′′2 ]〈N1〉.R1 | diff[M ′′1 ,M ′′2 ](x).R′1. Then   Q = P . Moreover nfS,(P ∪ {Q}) since
nfS,(P ∪ {R1, R′1, N1,M ′′1 ,M ′′2 }), and Q →′, Q′, hence the result.• Case (Red Fun 1): We have P = let x = D in R else R′ → R{diff[M,M ′]/x} = P ′ with fst(D)⇓ M and
snd(D)⇓ M ′. Since  Q′ = P ′ and nfS,(P ∪ {Q′}), we haveQ′ = R1{diff[M1,M ′1]/x} for someR1,M1,M ′1
such that   R1 = R,   M1 = M ,   M ′1 = M ′, and nfS,(P ∪ {R1,M1,M ′1}) by P3.
By Property S2, there existD1 andR′1 such that  D1 = D,  R′1 = R′, and nfS,(P ∪ {D1, R′1, R1,M1,M ′1}).
By Lemma 14, fst(D1)⇓′ M1 and snd(D1)⇓′ M ′1. Let Q = let x = D1 in R1 else R′1. Then   Q = P ,
nfS,(P ∪ {Q}), and Q →′, Q′.
• Case (Red Fun 2): We have P = let x = D in R else P ′ → P ′, there exists no M such that fst(D)⇓ M , and
there exists no M ′ such that snd(D)⇓ M ′. We have   Q′ = P ′ and nfS,(P ∪ {Q′}).
By Property S2, there exist D1 and R1 such that   D1 = D,   R1 = R and nfS,(P ∪ {R1,D1,Q′}). Then,
there exists no M such that fst(D1)⇓ M , and there exists no M ′ such that snd(D1)⇓ M ′. (Otherwise, by
Lemma 18, there would exist M such that fst(D)⇓ M , and M ′ such that snd(D)⇓ M ′.) Let Q = let x =
D1 in R1 else Q′. Then   Q = P , nfS,(P ∪ {Q}), and Q →′, Q′.
• Case (Red Repl): We have P = !R → R | !R = P ′. Since   Q′ = P ′ and nfS,(P ∪ {Q′}), we have Q′ =
R1 | !R1 for some R1 such that   R1 = R. Let Q = !R1. Then we have   Q = P , nfS,(P ∪ {Q}), and
Q →′, Q′.
• Cases (Red Par) and (Red Res): Easy by induction hypothesis.
• Case (Red ≡): Easy using the corresponding property for ≡ and the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, if P0 →∗≡ P ′0,   Q′0 = P ′0, and nfS,({Q′0}), then there exists Q0 such that nfS,({Q0}),   Q0 =
P0, and Q0 →∗′,≡ Q′0 by a reduction whose intermediate biprocesses Q all satisfy nfS,({Q}), simply by applying
several times the results shown above. Since the only process P such that   P0 = P and nfS,({P }) is P0, we have
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Q0 = P0, so we conclude that if P0 →∗≡ P ′0,   Q′0 = P ′0, and nfS,({Q′0}), then P0 →∗′,≡ Q′0 by a reduction
whose intermediate biprocesses Q all satisfy nfS,({Q}).
For the converse, we show that, if P ≡ P ′ and   Q = P , then there exists Q′ such that   Q′ = P ′ and
Q ≡ Q′. The proof is by induction on the derivation of P ≡ P ′. All cases are easy, since ≡ does not depend on terms.
We also show that, if VC(P ), P →′, P ′ and   Q = P , then there exists Q′ such that   Q′ = P ′, and
Q → Q′. The proof is by induction on the derivation of P →′, P ′.
• Case (Red I/O): Since VC(P ), we have P = diff[M1,M2]〈N〉.R | diff[M1,M2](x).R′ →′, R | R′{N/x} = P ′.
Since  Q = P , we haveQ = diff[M ′1,M ′2]〈N ′〉.R1 | diff[M ′′1 ,M ′′2 ](x).R′1 with  M1 = M ′1 = M ′′1 ,  M2 =
M ′2 = M ′′2 ,   N ′ = N ,   R = R1, and   R′ = R′1. Then Q → Q′ = R1 | R′1{N ′/x} with   Q′ = P ′.• Case (Red Fun 1): We have P = let x = D in R else R′ →′, R{diff[M1,M2]/x} = P ′ with fst(D)⇓′ M1 and
snd(D)⇓′ M2. Since   Q = P , we have Q = let x = D′ in R1 else R′1 with   D′ = D,   R1 = R, and
  R′1 = R′. By Lemma 17, fst(D′)⇓ M ′1 with   M1 = M ′1 and snd(D′)⇓ M ′2 with   M2 = M ′2. Hence
Q → Q′ = C′[R1{diff[M ′1,M ′2]/x}] with   Q′ = P ′.• Case (Red Fun 2): We have P = let x = D in R else P ′ →′, P ′, there exists no M1 such that fst(D)⇓ M1,
and there exists no M2 such that snd(D)⇓ M2. Since   Q = P , we have Q = let x = D′ in R1 else Q′ with
  D′ = D,   R1 = R, and   Q′ = P ′. Then, there exists no M ′1 such that fst(D′)⇓ M ′1, and there exists
no M ′2 such that snd(D′)⇓ M ′2. (Otherwise, by Lemma 18, there would exist M1 such that fst(D)⇓ M1 and M2
such that snd(D)⇓ M2.) Hence Q → Q′ and   Q′ = P ′.
• Case (Red Repl): We have P = !R →′, R | !R = P ′. Since   Q = P , we have Q = !R1 with   R1 = R.
Let Q′ = R1 | !R1. So   Q′ = P ′ and Q → Q′.
• Cases (Red Par) and (Red Res): Easy by induction hypothesis.
• Case (Red ≡): Easy using the corresponding property for ≡ and the induction hypothesis.
We conclude that, if P0 →∗′,≡ Q′0 then there exists P ′0 such that   Q′0 = P ′0 and P0 →∗≡ P ′0, simply by
applying several times the results shown above, with Q = P in the first application. 
B.3. Proof of Lemma 2
We first show that it is enough to consider unevaluated processes as initial configurations (Lemma 22), then prove
Lemma 2 itself.
Let P R P ′ if and only if P ′ is obtained from P by adding some lets on terms with constructors that occur in
inputs or outputs (for instance transforming M〈N〉.P into let x = M in let y = N in x〈y〉.P where x and y are fresh
variables), prefixing some constructors in lets with eval, and replacing some terms M with diff[fst(M), snd(M)].
For the next two proofs, we consider an alternative, equivalent definition of ≡, in which a symmetric rule Q ≡ P is
added for each rule P ≡ Q in the definition of ≡ and the implication P ≡ Q ⇒ Q ≡ P is removed from the definition
of ≡.
Lemma 20. If P R Q and P ≡ P ′ then there exists Q′ such that P ′ R Q′ and Q ≡ Q′.
If P R Q and P → P ′ then there exists Q′ such that P ′ R Q′ and Q →+ Q′.
Proof. Obvious, by induction on the derivation of P ≡ P ′ and P → P ′ respectively. 
Lemma 21. If   P = Q, Q R R, and R ≡ R′ then there exists P ′ and Q′ such that   P ′ = Q′, Q′ R R′, and
P ≡ P ′.
If  P = Q,Q R R, andR → R′ then there existsP ′ andQ′ such that  P ′ = Q′,Q′ R R′, andP → P ′
or P = P ′.
Proof. Obvious, by induction on the derivation of R ≡ R′ and R → R′ respectively. 
Lemma 22. Let P0 be a closed biprocess. The hypotheses of Corollary 1 are true if and only if they are true with
unevaluated(C[P0]) instead of C[P0].
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Proof. We have C[P0] R unevaluated(C[P0]). We first show that if the hypotheses of Corollary 1 are true for
unevaluated(C[P0]), then they are true for C[P0].
• If C[P0] →∗≡ C′1[N1〈M1〉.Q1 | N ′1(x).R1], then by Lemma 20, we have unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ P ′ with
C′1[N1〈M1〉.Q1 | N ′1(x).R1] R P ′. Then we haveP ′ →∗ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R]withC′1 R C′, fst(N) = fst(N1),
snd(N) = snd(N1), fst(N ′) = fst(N ′1), snd(N ′) = snd(N ′1), fst(M) = fst(M1), snd(M) = snd(M1), Q1 R Q, and
R1 R R, by reducing the term evaluations of constructors that may occur above inputs and outputs in P ′. So
unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R], with fst(N) = fst(N1), snd(N) = snd(N1), fst(N ′) = fst(N ′1),
and snd(N ′) = snd(N ′1). Hence, if the first hypothesis of Corollary 1 is true with unevaluated(C[P0]), then it is true
with C[P0].
• If C[P0] →∗≡ C′1[let y1 = D1 in Q1 else R1], then by the same reasoning as above, unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡
C′[P ] where let y1 = D1 in Q1 else R1 R P . Hence, we have P = let y1 = D′1 in Q′1 else R′1 where D′1 is
obtained by prefixing some constructors of D1 with eval and reorganizing diffs. We have fst(D1)⇓ M1 if and only
if fst(D′1)⇓ M1, if and only if snd(D′1)⇓ M2 (by the second hypothesis of Corollary 1 for unevaluated(C[P0])),
if and only if snd(D1)⇓ M2. This yields the second hypothesis of Corollary 1 for C[P0].
We now show the converse: if the hypotheses of Corollary 1 are true forC[P0], then they are true for unevaluated(C[P0]).
• Assume that unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C′1[N1〈M1〉.Q1 | N ′1(x).R1]. By Lemma 21, C[P0] →∗≡ P with  
P = P ′ and P ′ R C′1[N1〈M1〉.Q1 | N ′1(x).R1]. Then P = C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] with   fst(N) = fst(N1),
  snd(N) = snd(N1),   fst(N ′) = fst(N ′1),   snd(N ′) = snd(N ′1),   fst(M) = fst(M1), and
  snd(M) = snd(M1). So, if the first hypothesis of Corollary 1 is true with C[P0], then it is true with
unevaluated(C[P0]).
• Assume that unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C′1[let y1 = D1 in Q1 else R1]. By Lemma 21, C[P0] →∗≡ P with
  P = P ′ and P ′ R C′1[let y1 = D1 in Q1 else R1]. We have two cases:− Case 1: let y1 is introduced by R. Then R1 = 0 and D1 does not contain destructors. Hence there exists M1 such
that fst(D1)⇓ M1 and there exists M2 such that snd(D1)⇓ M2.
− Case 2: let y1 comes from P ′. Hence P = C′[let y1 = D′1 in Q′1 else R′1] where D′1 is obtained by removing some
eval prefixes of D1, reorganizing diffs, and replacing terms with equal terms modulo . We have fst(D1)⇓ M1
for some M1 if and only if fst(D′1)⇓ M1 for some M1, if and only if snd(D′1)⇓ M2 for some M2 (by the
second hypothesis of Corollary 1 for C[P0]), if and only if snd(D1)⇓ M2 for some M2.
This yields the second hypothesis of Corollary 1 for unevaluated(C[P0]). 
Lemma 2 is an obvious consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 23. Let P0 be a closed biprocess. Suppose that, for all plain evaluation contexts C, all evaluation contexts
C′, and all reductions unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′, P whose intermediate biprocesses P ′ all satisfy nfS,({P ′}),
1. if P ≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] and fst(N) = fst(N ′), then   snd(N) = snd(N ′),
2. if P ≡ C′[let x = D in Q else R] and fst(D)⇓′ M1 for some M1, then snd(D)⇓ M2 for some M2,
as well as the symmetric properties where we swap fst and snd. Then P0 satisfies the hypotheses of Corollary 1.
Conversely, if P0 satisfies the hypotheses of Corollary 1, then for all plain evaluation contexts C, evaluation contexts
C′, and reductions unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′ P, we have properties 1 and 2 above, as well as the symmetric properties
where we swap fst and snd.
Proof. By Lemma 22, we can work with unevaluated(C[P0]) instead of C[P0]. We show the two hypotheses of
Corollary 1.
• Assume that unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] and   fst(N) = fst(N ′). By Property S2,
there exists P ′ such that   P ′ = C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] and nfS,({P ′}). By Lemma 19, unevaluated(C[P0])
→∗
′,≡ P ′. Moreover, P ′ = C′′[diff[N1, N2]〈M ′〉.Q1 | diff[N ′1, N ′2](x).R1], where   N1 = fst(N),   N2 =
snd(N),   N ′1 = fst(N ′), and   N ′2 = snd(N ′). Since nfS,({P ′}), N1 = N ′1. Hence, by hypothesis 1,  
N2 = N ′2. So   snd(N) = snd(N ′).
We obtain the case unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] and   snd(N) = snd(N ′) by symmetry.
• Assume that unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C′[let y = D in Q else R] and there exists M1 such that fst(D)⇓ M1. By
Property S2, there exist P ′, M ′1, and D′ such that   P ′ = C′[let y = D in Q else R],   M ′1 = M1,   D′ =
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D, and nfS,({P ′,M ′1,D′}). ThenP ′ = C′′[let y = D′ inQ′ elseR′]. By Lemma 19, unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡
P ′. By Lemma 14, fst(D′)⇓′ M ′1. By hypothesis 2, snd(D′)⇓ M ′2. By Lemma 18, since   snd(D′) = snd(D)
and snd(D′)⇓ M ′2, we have snd(D)⇓ M2.
We obtain the case unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C′[let y = D in Q else R] and there exists M2 such that
snd(D)⇓ M2 by symmetry.
Next, we prove the converse property.
• Assume that unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] and fst(N) = fst(N ′). By Lemma 19, we have
unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C1[N1〈M1〉.Q1 | N1(x).R1] with   C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] = C1[N1〈M1〉.Q1| N1(x).R1] so   N = N1 and   N ′ = N ′1. Using the first hypothesis of Corollary 1, since   fst(N1) =
fst(N ′1), we have   snd(N1) = snd(N ′1), hence   snd(N) = snd(N ′).
We obtain the case unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡ C′[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R] and snd(N) = snd(N ′) by symmetry.
• Assume that unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡ C′[let y = D in Q else R] and there exists M1 such that fst(D)⇓′ M1.
As above, unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗≡ C1[let y = D1 in Q1 else R1] with   D1 = D. By Lemma 17,
fst(D1)⇓ M ′1 for some M ′1. Using the second hypothesis of Corollary 1, snd(D1)⇓ M ′2, hence by Lemma 18,
snd(D)⇓ M2.
We obtain the case unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡ C′[let y = D in Q else R] and there exists M2 such that
snd(D)⇓′ M2 by symmetry. 
C. Proof of Lemma 3
When F is a set that contains patterns, facts, sequences of patterns or facts, clauses, environments that map variables
and names to pairs of patterns, . . . , we say that nfS,(F) if and only if all patterns that appear in F are irreducible by
S and for all p1, p2 subpatterns of elements of F , if   p1 = p2 then p1 = p2.
We say that nf ′S,(F) if and only if nfS,(F ′) where F ′ is obtained from F by removing nounif facts. When D is
a derivation, we say that nf ′S,(D) when nf ′S,(F) where F is the set of intermediately derived facts of D.
We say that F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn ∼ F ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ F ′n when, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either Fi = F ′i or Fi and F ′i are nounif
facts and   Fi = F ′i . We say that   F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn ∼ F ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ F ′n when for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},   Fi = F ′i .
This definition is naturally extended to clauses.
The special treatment of nounif facts in the definition of ∼ and in Lemma 3 is necessary so that the following results
hold. In particular, Lemma 28 would be wrong for Clauses (Rt) and (Rt′), which contain nounif facts.
Lemma 24. If h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N is in def′(h),   N ′′ = σN,   N ′′i = σNi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
nfS,({N ′′1 , . . . , N ′′n ,N ′′}), then there exist a closed substitution σ ′ and h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def′(h) such that
N ′′ = σ ′N ′ and N ′′i = σ ′N ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. The result follows from Lemmas 16 and 13. 
The following lemma generalizes Lemma 15 to the case in which D may contain destructors. It is used in the proof
of Lemma 26 below.
Lemma 25. Let D be a plain term evaluation. If D ⇓′ (p, σ ) and σ ′ is a closed substitution, then there exists p′ such
that σ ′σD ⇓ p′ and   p′ = σ ′p.
Let D1, . . . , Dn be plain term evaluations. If (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((p1, . . . , pn), σ ) and σ ′ is a closed substitution
then there exist p′1, . . . , p′n such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σ ′σDi ⇓ p′i and   p′i = σ ′pi .
Proof. The proof is by mutual induction following the definition of ⇓′.
• Case D = p: We have p ⇓′ (p,∅), σ = ∅, so σ ′σD = σ ′p⇓ σ ′p, so we have the result with p′ = σ ′p.
• CaseD = eval h(D1, . . . , Dn): Since eval h(D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ (p, σ ), there exist h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def′(h),
p1, . . . , pn, σ ′′, and σu such that (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((p1, . . . , pn), σ ′′), σu is a most general unifier of (p1, . . . , pn)
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and (N1, . . . , Nn), p = σuN , and σ = σuσ ′′. By induction hypothesis, there exist p′1, . . . , p′n such that for all i ∈{1, . . . , n}, σ ′σuσ ′′Di ⇓ p′i and   p′i = σ ′σupi , so σ ′σDi ⇓ p′i . By Lemma 16, there exist h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) →
N ′ in def(h) and σ1 such that   Ni = σ1N ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and   N = σ1N ′. So   p′i = σ ′σupi =
σ ′σuNi = σ ′σuσ1N ′i and   σ ′p = σ ′σuN = σ ′σuσ1N ′. Let p′ = σ ′σuσ1N ′. We have σ ′σD ⇓ p′ and  
p′ = σ ′p.
• Case (D1, . . . , Dn): Since (D1, . . . , Dn) ⇓′ ((p1, . . . , pn), σ ), we have (D1, . . . , Dn−1) ⇓′ ((p′′1 , . . . , p′′n−1), σ1),
σ1Dn ⇓′ (pn, σ2), pi = σ2p′′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, and σ = σ2σ1. By induction hypothesis, there exist
p′1, . . . , p′n−1 such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, σ ′σ2σ1Di ⇓′ p′i and   p′i = σ ′σ2p′′i , so σ ′σDi ⇓′ p′i and
  p′i = σ ′pi . Also by induction hypothesis, there exists p′n such that σ ′σ2σ1Dn ⇓′ p′n and   p′n = σ ′pn, so
σ ′σDn ⇓′ p′n and   p′n = σ ′pn. 
Lemma 26. Let D be a plain term evaluation such that the subterms M of D are variables or names. If ρ(D) ⇓′
(p′, σ ′), σ is a closed substitution,  p = σp′,  σ ′0ρ′ = σσ ′ρ, and nfS,({p, σ ′0ρ′}), then there existσ ′′, p′′, σ ′′0
such thatρ′(D) ⇓′ (p′′, σ ′′), σ ′0 = σ ′′0 σ ′′ except on fresh variables introduced in the computation ofρ′(D) ⇓′ (p′′, σ ′′),
and p = σ ′′0 p′′.
Let Di (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) be plain term evaluations such that the subterms M of Di are variables or names. If
(ρ(D1), . . . , ρ(Dn)) ⇓′ ((p′1, . . . , p′n), σ ′), σ is a closed substitution,   pi = σp′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},  
σ ′0ρ′ = σσ ′ρ, and nfS,({p1, . . . , pn, σ ′0ρ′}), then there exist σ ′′, p′′1 , . . . , p′′n , σ ′′0 such that (ρ′(D1), . . . , ρ′(Dn)) ⇓′
((p′′1 , . . . , p′′n), σ ′′), σ ′0 = σ ′′0 σ ′′ except on fresh variables introduced in the computation of (ρ′(D1), . . . , ρ′(Dn)) ⇓′
((p′′1 , . . . , p′′n), σ ′′), and pi = σ ′′0 p′′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. We prove the first property. (The second one follows in a similar way.) By Lemma 25, there exists p1 such that
σσ ′ρ(D)⇓ p1 and   p1 = σp′. Then   p = p1,   σ ′0ρ′(D) = σσ ′ρ(D), and nfS,({p, σ ′0ρ′(D)}). So by
a variant of Lemma 14 for patterns instead of terms, σ ′0ρ′(D)⇓′ p. By a variant of Lemma 11 for patterns instead of
terms, we obtain the desired result. 
Lemma 27. Let P0 be a closed, unevaluated process. If [[P ]]ρss′H is called during the generation of [[P0]]ρ0∅∅∅,
σ is a closed substitution,   ρ2 = σρ,   s2 = σs,   s′2 = σs′,   H2 ∼ σH, and nf ′S,({ρ2, s2, s′2, H2}),
then there exist σ1, ρ1, H1, s1, s′1 such that ρ2 = σ1ρ1, s2 = σ1s1, s′2 = σ1s′1, H2 ∼ σ1H1, and [[P ]]ρ1s1s′1H1 is called
during the generation of [[P0]]ρ0∅∅∅.
Proof. The process P is a subprocess of P0. We proceed by induction on P : we show the result for P0 itself, and we
show that if the result is true for some occurrence of P , then it is also true for the occurrences of the direct subprocesses
of P .
• Case P0: We have ρ2 = ρ0, s2 = s′2 = ∅, and H2 = ∅. Then we obtain the result by letting σ1 be any substitution,
ρ1 = ρ0, s1 = s′1 = ∅, and H1 = ∅.• Case 0: Void, since it has no subprocesses.
• Case P | Q: Obvious by induction hypothesis.
• Case !P : Assume [[P ]]ρss′H is called. Then ρ = ρ3, s = (s3, i), s′ = (s′3, i), H = H3, and [[!P ]]ρ3s3s′3H3 has been
called. Let ρ2, s2, s′2, H2 such that   ρ2 = σρ,   s2 = σs,   s′2 = σs′,   H2 ∼ σH , and
nf ′S,({ρ2, s2, s′2, H2}).
Thenρ2 = ρ4, s2 = (s4, p), s′2 = (s′4, p),H2 = H4 where  ρ4 = σρ3,  s4 = σs3,  s′4 = σs′3,  H4 ∼
σH3, and   p = σ i.
By induction hypothesis, there exist σ1, ρ5, s5, s′5, H5 such that ρ4 = σ1ρ5, s4 = σ1s5, s′4 = σ1s′5, H4 ∼ σ1H5, and[[!P ]]ρ5s5s′5H5 has been called. Since i is a fresh variable, we can define σ1i = p.
Then [[P ]]ρ5(s5, i)(s′5, i)H5 has been called, ρ2 = σ1ρ5, s2 = σ1(s5, i), s′2 = σ1(s′5, i), and H2 ∼ σ1H5.• Case (νa)P : Assume [[P ]]ρss′H is called. Thenρ = ρ3[a → (a[s], a[s′])] and [[(νa)P ]]ρ3ss′H has been called. Let
ρ2, s2, s
′
2, H2 such that   ρ2 = σρ,   s2 = σs,   s′2 = σs′,   H2 ∼ σH , and nf ′S,({ρ2, s2, s′2, H2}).
Then ρ2 = ρ4[a → (a[s2], a[s′2])] where   ρ4 = σρ3.
By induction hypothesis, there exist σ1, ρ5, s1, s′1, H1 such that ρ4 = σ1ρ5, s2 = σ1s1, s′2 = σ1s′1, H2 ∼ σ1H1, and[[(νa)P ]]ρ5s1s′1H1 has been called.
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Then [[P ]](ρ5[a → (a[s1], a[s′1])])s1s′1H1 has been called, ρ2 = σ1(ρ5[a → (a[s1], a[s′1])]), s2 = σ1s1, s′2 = σ1s′1,
and H2 ∼ σ1H1.
• Case M〈N〉.P : Obvious by induction hypothesis.
• Case M(x).P : Assume [[P ]]ρss′H is called. Then ρ = ρ3[x → (x′, x′′)], s = (s3, x′), s′ = (s′3, x′′), H = H3 ∧
msg′(ρ3(M)1, x′, ρ3(M)2, x′′), and [[M(x).P ]]ρ3s3s′3H3 has been called. Let ρ2, s2, s′2, H2 such that   ρ2 = σρ,
  s2 = σs,   s′2 = σs′,   H2 ∼ σH , and nf ′S,({ρ2, s2, s′2, H2}).
Then ρ2 = ρ4[x → (p′, p′′)], s2 = (s4, p′), s′2 = (s′4, p′′), H2 = H4 ∧ msg′(ρ4(M)1, p′, ρ4(M)2, p′′) where  
ρ4 = σρ3,   s4 = σs3,   s′4 = σs′3,   H4 ∼ σH3,   p′ = σx′, and   p′′ = σx′′. (Since P0 is un-
evaluated, M is a variable y or diff[a, a] for some name a. Let u = y in the first case and u = a in the second case.
We have u ∈ dom(ρ3) = dom(ρ4). We have nf ′S,({ρ2, s2, s′2, H2}) so a fortiori nf ′S,({ρ4, H2}), and the first and
third arguments of msg′ are equal to ρ4(M)1 = ρ4(u)1 and ρ4(M)2 = ρ4(u)2 modulo  respectively, so they are
exactly ρ4(M)1 and ρ4(M)2.)
By induction hypothesis, there exist σ1, ρ5, s5, s′5, H5 such that ρ4 = σ1ρ5, s4 = σ1s5, s′4 = σ1s′5, H4 ∼ σ1H5,
and [[M(x).P ]]ρ5s5s′5H5 has been called. Since x′ and x′′ are fresh variables, we can define σ1x′ = p′ and
σ1x′′ = p′′.
Then [[P ]](ρ5[x → (x′, x′′)])(s5, x′)(s′5, x′′)(H5 ∧ msg′(ρ5(M)1, x′, ρ5(M)2, x′′)) has been called, and ρ2 =
σ1(ρ5[x → (x′, x′′)]), s2 = σ1(s5, x′), s′2 = σ1(s′5, x′′), and H2 ∼ σ1(H5 ∧ msg′(ρ5(M)1, x′, ρ5(M)2, x′′)).• Case let x = D in P else Q:
Subprocess P : Assume [[P ]]ρss′H is called. Then we have ρ = (σ1ρ3)[x → (p1, p′1)], s = (σ1s3, p1), s′ =
(σ1s
′
3, p
′
1), and H = σ1H3 where [[let x = D in P else Q]]ρ3s3s′3H3 has been called and (ρ(D)1, ρ(D)2) ⇓′
((p1, p
′
1), σ1). Let ρ2, s2, s
′
2, H2 such that   ρ2 = σρ,   s2 = σs,   s′2 = σs′,   H2 ∼ σH , and
nf ′S,({ρ2, s2, s′2, H2}).
Then ρ2 = ρ4[x → (p4, p′4)], s2 = (s4, p4), s′2 = (s′4, p′4), H2 = H4 with   ρ4 = σσ1ρ3,   s4 = σσ1s3,  
s4 = σσ1s′3,   H4 ∼ σσ1H3,   p4 = σp1,   p′4 = σp′1, and nf ′S,({ρ4, s4, s′4, H4, p4, p′4}).
By induction hypothesis, there exist σ ′0, ρ5, s5, s′5, H5 such that ρ4 = σ ′0ρ5, s4 = σ ′0s5, s′4 = σ ′0s′4, H4 ∼ σ ′0H5, and[[let x = D in P else Q]]ρ5s5s′5H5 has been called.
By Lemma 26, there exist σ2, p2, p′2, and σ3 such that (ρ5(D)1, ρ5(D)2) ⇓′ ((p2, p′2), σ2), σ ′0 = σ3σ2 except on
fresh variables introduced in the computation of (ρ5(D)1, ρ5(D)2) ⇓′ ((p2, p′2), σ2), p4 = σ3p2, and p′4 = σ3p′2.
Moreover, by definition of [[let x = D in P else Q]], [[P ]]((σ2ρ5)[x → (p2, p′2)])(σ2s5, p2)(σ2s′5, p′2)(σ2H5) has
been called, so we obtain the result by letting ρ1 = (σ2ρ5)[x → (p2, p′2)], s1 = (σ2s5, p2), s′1 = (σ2s′5, p′2), H1 =
σ2H5: we have ρ2 = ρ4[x → (p4, p′4)] = (σ ′0ρ5)[x → (σ3p2, σ3p′2)] = σ3((σ2ρ5)[x → (p2, p′2)]) = σ3ρ1, and
similarly for s2, s′2, and H2.
Subprocess Q: Assume [[Q]]ρss′H is called. Then H = H3 ∧ ρ(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧ ρ(fails(snd(D)))2 and [[let x =
D in P else Q]]ρss′H3 has been called. Let ρ2, s2, s′2, H2 such that   ρ2 = σρ,   s2 = σs,   s′2 = σs′,
  H2 ∼ σH , and nf ′S,({ρ2, s2, s′2, H2}). Then H2 = H4 ∧ H4nounif where H4nounif consists of nounif facts,
  H4nounif ∼ σρ(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧ σρ(fails(snd(D)))2, and   H4 ∼ σH3.
By induction hypothesis, there exist σ1, ρ1, s1, s′1, H5 such that ρ2 = σ1ρ1, s2 = σ1s1, s′2 = σ1s′1, H4 ∼ σ1H5, and[[let x = D in P else Q]]ρ1s1s′1H5 has been called.
Then [[Q]]ρ1s1s′1(H5 ∧ ρ1(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧ ρ1(fails(snd(D)))2) has been called, which yields the desired result,
knowing that H2 = H4 ∧ H4nounif ∼ σ1H5 ∧ σ1ρ1(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧ σ1ρ1(fails(snd(D)))2, since   σ1ρ1 =
ρ2 = σρ. 
Lemma 28. Let P0 be a closed, unevaluated process. For all clauses H → C ∈ RP0 , for all closed substitutions σ,
for all H2 → C2 such that   H2 → C2 ∼ σ(H → C) and nf ′S,({H2, C2}), there exist a closed substitution σ1
and a clause H1 → C1 ∈ RP0 such that H2 ∼ σ1H1 and C2 = σ1C1.
Proof. The clauses of [[P0]]ρ0∅∅∅ are generated from the following cases:
• H → C = H → input′(ρ(M)1, ρ(M)2) where [[M(x).P ]]ρss′H has been called during the generation
of [[P0]]ρ0∅∅∅. Since   H2 → C2 ∼ σ(H → C) and nf ′S,({H2, C2}), we have   H2 ∼ σH , C2 =
input′(p2, p′2),   p2 = σρ(M)1, and   p′2 = σρ(M)2.
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Since P0 is unevaluated, M is a variable y or diff[a, a] for some name a. Let u = y in the first case and u = a
in the second case. We have u ∈ dom(ρ). We define ρ2 by ρ2(u) = diff[p2, p′2] and extend ρ2 to dom(ρ) in such
a way that   ρ2 = σρ and nf ′S,({H2, ρ2}) by Property S2. We also define s2 and s′2 so that   s2 = σs,
  s′2 = σs′, and nf ′S,({H2, ρ2, s2, s′2}) by Property S2. By Lemma 27, there exist σ1, ρ1, s1, s′1, H1 such that
ρ2 = σ1ρ1, s2 = σ1s1, s′2 = σ1s′1, H2 ∼ σ1H1, and [[M(x).P ]]ρ1s1s′1H1 has been called.
Then H1 → input′(ρ1(M)1, ρ1(M)2) is in [[P0]]ρ0∅∅∅, H2 ∼ σ1H1, C2 = input′(p2, p′2) = input′(ρ2(M)1,
ρ2(M)2) = σ1input′(ρ1(M)1, ρ1(M)2).
• H → C = H → msg′(ρ(M)1, ρ(N)1, ρ(M)2, ρ(N)2) where [[M〈N〉.P ]]ρss′H has been called. This case is
similar to the previous one. (The terms M and N are variables or diff[a, a] for some name a.)
• H → C = σ ′H ′ ∧ σ ′ρ(fails(snd(D)))2 → bad where [[let x = D inP elseQ]]ρss′H ′ has been called andρ(D)1 ⇓′
(p′, σ ′). Since   H2 → C2 ∼ σ(H → C) and nf ′S,({H2, C2}), we have H2 = H3 ∧ H3nounif where   H3 ∼
σσ ′H ′ and H3nounif consists of nounif facts such that   H3nounif ∼ σσ ′ρ(fails(snd(D)))2. By Property S2, there
exist ρ3, s3, s′3 such that   ρ3 = σσ ′ρ,   s3 = σσ ′s,   s′3 = σσ ′s′, and nf ′S,({ρ3, s3, s′3, H3}).
By Lemma 27, there exist σ1, ρ1, s1, s′1, H1 such that ρ3 = σ1ρ1, s3 = σ1s1, s′3 = σ1s′1, H3 ∼ σ1H1, and [[let x =
D in P else Q]]ρ1s1s′1H1 has been called.
By Property S2, we can choose p such that   p = σp′ and nfS,({p, σ1ρ1}). By Lemma 26, there exist σ ′1,
p′1, and σ ′′1 such that ρ1(D)1 ⇓′ (p′1, σ ′1) and σ1 = σ ′′1 σ ′1 except on fresh variables introduced in the computa-
tion of ρ1(D)1 ⇓′ (p′1, σ ′1). Then σ ′1H1 ∧ σ ′1ρ1(fails(snd(D)))2 → bad is in [[P0]]ρ0∅∅∅. Moreover σ ′′1 (σ ′1H1 ∧
σ ′1ρ1(fails(snd(D)))2) = σ1H1 ∧ σ1ρ1(fails(snd(D)))2 ∼ H3 ∧ H3nounif ∼ H2, since   σ1ρ1 = ρ3 = σσ ′ρ,
and σ ′′1 bad = bad = C, so we have the desired result.• H → C = σ ′H ′ ∧ σ ′ρ(fails(fst(D)))1 → bad where [[let x = D inP elseQ]]ρss′H ′ has been called andρ(D)2 ⇓′
(p′, σ ′). This case is symmetric from the previous one.
For the other clauses:
• For Clause (Rinit), C2 = C, H2 = ∅, so we have the result by taking H1 → C1 = H → C.
• For Clauses (Rn), (Rl), (Rs), (Ri), (Rcom), and (Rcom′), H2 = σ ′H and C2 = σ ′C where for all x ∈ fv(H →
C),   σ ′x = σx, and nfS,({σ ′x | x ∈ fv(H → C)}). (Indeed, the function symbols in H,C do not appear in
equations of .) So we obtain the result by taking H1 → C1 = H → C and σ1 = σ ′.
• For Clause (Rf), H = att′(M1, N1) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(Mn,Nn), C = att′(M,N), h(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M in def′(h),
h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def′(h), H2 = att′(M ′′1 , N ′′1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(M ′′n ,N ′′n ), C2 = att′(M ′′, N ′′) with   M ′′ =
σM ,   N ′′ = σN ,   M ′′i = σMi and   N ′′i = σNi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and nfS,({M ′′, N ′′,M ′′1 ,
. . . ,M ′′n ,N ′′1 , . . . , N ′′n }). By Lemma 24, there exist σ1 and h(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) → M ′ in def′(h) such that M ′′ =
σ1M ′ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, M ′′i = σ1M ′i . By Lemma 24 again, there exist σ1 and h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in
def′(h) such that N ′′ = σ1N ′ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, N ′′i = σ1N ′i . (We can use the same substitution σ1 since
the first and second arguments of the predicate att′ do not share variables.) Hence σ1att′(M ′i , N ′i ) = att′(M ′′i , N ′′i ) for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and σ1att′(M ′, N ′) = att′(M ′′, N ′′). We take H1 → C1 = att′(M ′1, N ′1) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(M ′n,N ′n) →
att′(M ′, N ′), which yields the desired result.
• For Clause (Rt), we have C2 = C = bad, H = Hnounif ∧ att′(M1, x1) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(Mn, xn), H2 = H2nounif ∧
att′(M ′′1 , N ′′1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(M ′′n ,N ′′n ) where Hnounif and H2nounif consist of nounif facts,   H2nounif = σHnounif ,
g(M1, . . . ,Mn) → M in def′(g),   M ′′i = σMi and   N ′′i = σxi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
nfS,({M ′′1 , . . . ,M ′′n ,N ′′1 , . . . , N ′′n }). By Lemma 24, there exist σ1 and g(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n) → M ′ in def′(g) such
that M ′′ = σ1M ′ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, M ′′i = σ1M ′i . We extend σ1 by defining for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σ1xi =
N ′′i . Hence σ1att′(M ′i , xi) = att′(M ′′i , N ′′i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and   H2nounif = σHnounif = σ1Hnounif since
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},   σ1xi = N ′′i = σxi and fv(Hnounif) = {x1, . . . , xn}. We take H1 → C1 = Hnounif ∧
att′(M ′1, x1) ∧ . . . ∧ att′(M ′n, xn) → bad which yields the result.
The case of Clause (Rt′) is symmetric. 
Lemma 29. Assume P0 is a closed, unevaluated process. If F is derivable from RP0 ,   F ′′ ∼ F, and nf ′S,(F ∪
{F ′′}), then F ′′ is derivable from RP0 by a derivation D such that nf ′S,(F ∪ {D}).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of F . Assume that F is derived from F1, . . . , Fn, using a clause
R ∈ RP0 : there exists a closed substitution σ such that σR = F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn → F . Let F ′′ such that   F ′′ ∼ F
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and nf ′S,(F ∪ {F ′′}). By Property S2, there exist F ′′1 , . . . , F ′′n such that   F ′′i ∼ Fi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
nf ′S,(F ∪ {F ′′, F ′′1 , . . . , F ′′n }). By Lemma 28, there exist a closed substitution σ1 and a clause R′ = F ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ F ′n →
F ′ ∈ RP0 such that F ′′ = σ1F ′ and F ′′i ∼ σ1F ′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. So F ′′ is derivable from F ′′1 , . . . , F ′′n by
R′. Furthermore, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},   F ′′i ∼ Fi , nf ′S,(F ∪ {F ′′1 , . . . , F ′′n , F ′′}), and Fi is derivable from
RP0 . So by induction hypothesis, F ′′i is derivable from RP0 , by a derivation Di such that nfS,(F ∪ {D1, . . . ,Di ,
F ′′i+1, . . . , F ′′n , F ′′}). (We apply the induction hypothesis with F ∪ {D1, . . . ,Di−1, F ′′i+1, . . . , F ′′n , F ′′}
instead of F ∪ {F ′′}.) Then F ′′ is derivable from RP0 by a derivation D built from D1, . . . ,Dn and R′, such that
nf ′S,(F ∪ {D}). 
Lemma 3 is a particular case of Lemma 29, taking F = F ′′ = bad.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
The following lemma is useful for establishing the soundness of the translation of “there exists no p such that
σD ⇓ p” into σ fails(D). This translation appears when we show the soundness of clauses for term evaluations.
Lemma 30. If σ fails(D) is false then there exists a pattern p such that σD ⇓ p.
Proof. By definition of fails, there exist a pattern p and σ ′ such that D ⇓′ (p, σ ′) and σnounif(D,GVar(σ ′D)) is
false. By definition of nounif, there exists a closed σ ′′ such that   σD = σ ′′σ ′D. By Lemma 25, since D ⇓′ (p, σ ′),
there exists p′ such that σ ′′σ ′D ⇓ p′ and   p′ = σ ′′p. By a variant of Lemma 18 for patterns instead of terms,
  σD = σ ′′σ ′D implies σD ⇓ p′′ for some p′′ such that   p′′ = p′. 
Proof (of Theorem 3). We exploit the theory developed in [3,16] to prove the hypotheses of Lemma 2. This theory
uses a type system to express the invariant that corresponds to the soundness of the clauses, and a subject reduction
theorem to show that the invariant is indeed preserved. Here, types range over pairs of closed patterns, after adding
constant session identifiers λ to the grammar of patterns.
We first define instrumented biprocesses in which a pattern is associated with each name. The syntax of instrumented
biprocesses is the same as the syntax of biprocesses except that the replication is replaced with !iP where i is a variable
session identifier and the restriction is replaced with (νa : a0[M1, . . . ,Mn]) where a0 is a function symbol and
M1, . . . ,Mn are terms or (constant or variable) session identifiers. In Section 6.3 and below, we reuse the name a as
function symbol a0. In contrast with a and any names occurring in M1, . . . ,Mn, however, the function symbol a0 is
not subject to renaming, so we may have a /= a0 after an α-conversion on a.
To every closed biprocessP with pairwise distinct bound variables, we associate the instrumented biprocess instr(P )
obtained by adding a distinct session identifier i to each replication in P and by labelling each restriction (νa) of P
with (νa : a[x1, . . . , xn]) where x1, . . . , xn are the variables and session identifiers bound above (νa) in instr(P ).
Conversely, we let delete(P ) be the biprocess obtained by erasing instrumentation from any instrumented biprocess
P .
We define the semantics of instrumented biprocesses using configurations ;P where  is a countable set of
constant session identifiers and P is an instrumented biprocess. Intuitively,  is the set of session identifiers not yet
used in the reduction of P . The rule (Red Repl) is defined as follows for instrumented biprocesses:
; !iP →  − {λ}; !iP | P {λ/i} if λ ∈ 
This rule chooses a fresh session identifier λ in , removes it from , and uses it for the new copy of P . The other
rules of Figs. 2 and 3 that define reduction and structural congruence are lifted from P → Q to ;P → ;Q and
from P ≡ Q to ;P ≡ ;Q.
By construction, instrumented biprocesses include the variables that were collected by s and s′ in the definition of
[[_]]ρss′H of Section 6.3. Hence, the clauses [[P ]]ρ0∅∅∅ can be computed from instr(P ) as follows: [[P ]]ρ0∅∅∅ =
[[instr(P )]]ρ0∅ where
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[[0]]ρH = ∅
[[!iP ]]ρH = [[P ]](ρ[i → (i, i)])H
[[P | Q]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ [[Q]]ρH
[[(νa : a[x1, . . . , xn])P ]]ρH
= [[P ]](ρ[a → (a[ρ(x1)1, . . . , ρ(xn)1], a[ρ(x1)2, . . . , ρ(xn)2])])H
[[M(x).P ]]ρH
= [[P ]](ρ[x → (x′, x′′)])(H ∧ msg′(ρ(M)1, x′, ρ(M)2, x′′)) ∪ {H → input′(ρ(M)1, ρ(M)2)}
where x′ and x′′ are fresh variables
[[M〈N〉.P ]]ρH = [[P ]]ρH ∪ {H → msg′(ρ(M)1, ρ(N)1, ρ(M)2, ρ(N)2)}
[[let x = D in P else Q]]ρH
=
⋃
{[[P ]]((σρ)[x → (p, p′)])(σH) | (ρ(D)1, ρ(D)2) ⇓′ ((p, p′), σ )}
∪ [[Q]]ρ(H ∧ ρ(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧ ρ(fails(snd(D)))2)
∪ {σH ∧ σρ(fails(snd(D)))2 → bad | ρ(D)1 ⇓′ (p, σ )}
∪ {σH ∧ σρ(fails(fst(D)))1 → bad | ρ(D)2 ⇓′ (p′, σ )}
Let C be a plain evaluation context. For each reduction unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡ P , there is a reduction
0; instr(unevaluated(C[P0])) →∗′,≡ ;P ′ such that delete(P ′) = P (and conversely). Let P ′0 =
instr(unevaluated(P0)). There exists an unevaluated evaluation context C′ such that diff occurs only in terms diff[a, a]
for some names a in C′ and instr(unevaluated(C[P0])) = C′[P ′0].
Let RC′,P0 be the set of clauses obtained by adding to RP0 the clauses
att′(a[x1, . . . , xn], a[x1, . . . , xn]) (Rn′)
such that either (νa : a[x′1, . . . , x′n]) occurs in C′ or n = 0, a ∈ fn(C′), and a /∈ fn(P ′0). The fact bad is derivable from
RC′,P0 if and only if bad is derivable from RP0 , since we can replace all patterns a[. . . ] of names created by the
context C′ with patterns b[i], as long as different names have different images, so we can replace the Clauses (Rn′)
with Clause (Rn). Hence, the definition of RP0 is sufficient.
Next, we define a type system, similar to that of [3, Section 7]. Here, the types are pairs of closed patterns. The type
environment E is a function from variables and names to types. It is extended to terms as a substitution, so that a term
M has type E(M). The typing judgment E  P says that the instrumented biprocess P is well-typed in environment
E. This judgment is formally defined in Fig. 5, where FC′,P0 is the set of closed facts derivable from RC′,P0 .
When M1, . . . ,Mn is a sequence of terms and (variable or constant) session identifiers, as in labels of restrictions,
we define last(M1, . . . ,Mn) as the last Mi that is a session identifier, or ∅ when no Mi is a session identifier. Let us
define the multiset Label(P ) as follows: Label((νa : a0[M1, . . . ,Mn])P ) = {(a0, last(M1, . . . ,Mn))} ∪ Label(P ),
Label(!iP ) = ∅, and in all other cases, Label(P ) is the union of the Label(P ′) for all immediate subprocesses P ′ of
P . When E maps names to closed patterns, let Label(E) = {(a0, last(M1, . . . ,Mn)) | (a → a0[M1, . . . ,Mn] ∈ E}.
Let Label() = {(a, λ) | λ ∈ }. We say that E  ;P is well-labelled when the multisets Label(E1) ∪ Label() ∪
Label(P ) and Label(E2) ∪ Label() ∪ Label(P ) contain no duplicates, where E1 and E2 are the first and second
components of E. We say that E  ;P when E  ;P is well-labelled and E  P . Showing that Label(E1) and
Label(E2) contain no duplicates guarantees that different terms have different types. More precisely, if E maps names
to closed patterns a[. . . ], E is extended to terms as a substitution, and Label(E) contains no duplicates, then we have
the following properties:
E1. E is an injection (if E(M) = E(N) then M = N ) and also an injection modulo  (if   E(M) = E(N) then
  M = N ).
E2. Let N be a term not containing names; if E(M ′) is an instance of N , then M ′ is an instance of N ; if E(M ′) is
an instance of N modulo , then M ′ is an instance of N modulo .
E3. If D ⇓′ M , then E(D)⇓′ E(M). (This is proved by induction on D.)
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input′(E(M)1, E(M)2) ∈ FC′,P0∀p1, p2 such that msg′(E(M)1, p1, E(M)2, p2) ∈ FC′,P0 , E[x → (p1, p2)]  P
E  M(x).P (Input)
msg′(E(M)1, E(N)1, E(M)2, E(N)2) ∈ FC′,P0 E  P
E  M〈N〉.P (Output)
E  0 (Nil)
E  P E  Q
E  P | Q (Parallel)
∀λ,E[i → (λ, λ)]  P
E !iP (Replication)
E[a → (a0[E(M1)1, . . . , E(Mn)1], a0[E(M1)2, . . . , E(Mn)2]) ]  P
E  (νa : a0[M1, . . . ,Mn])P (Restriction)
∀p1, p2 such that E(D)1 ⇓′ p1 and E(D)2 ⇓′ p2, E[x → (p1, p2)]  P
if  ∃p1, E(D)1 ⇓ p1 and  ∃p2, E(D)2 ⇓ p2, then E  Q
if ∃p1, E(D)1 ⇓′ p1 and  ∃p2, E(D)2 ⇓ p2, then bad ∈ FC′,P0
if  ∃p1, E(D)1 ⇓ p1 and ∃p2, E(D)2 ⇓′ p2, then bad ∈ FC′,P0
E  let x = D in P else Q (Term evaluation)
Fig. 5. Type rules.
E4. If   D′ = E(D) and D′ ⇓ p′ then there exists M such that   p′ = E(M) and D ⇓ M . (This is proved
by induction on D, using E2.)
Let E0 = {a → (a[ ], a[ ]) | a ∈ fn(C′[P ′0])}.
1. Typability of the adversary: Let P ′ be a subprocess of C′. Let E be an environment such that for all a ∈ fn(P ′),
att′(E(a), E(a)) ∈ FC′,P0 and for all x ∈ fv(P ′), att′(E(x), E(x)) ∈ FC′,P0 . We show that E  P ′ by induction on
P ′, similarly to [3, Lemma 5.1.4].
We detail the case of term evaluations, since it significantly differs from that in [3]. In order to show the desired
property in this case, it suffices to show that if for all a ∈ fn(D), att′(E(a), E(a)) ∈ FC′,P0 and for all x ∈ fv(D),
att′(E(x), E(x)) ∈ FC′,P0 , then we have the two properties:
(a) if E(D)1 ⇓′ p1 and E(D)2 ⇓′ p2, then att′(p1, p2) ∈ FC′,P0 ;
(b) if E(D)1 ⇓′ p1 and  ∃p2, E(D)2 ⇓ p2, then bad ∈ FC′,P0 ; symmetrically, if E(D)2 ⇓′ p2 and  ∃p1,
E(D)1 ⇓ p1, then bad ∈ FC′,P0 .
The proof is by induction on D.
• Case D = diff[a, a]: We have E(D)1 = E(a)1 ⇓′ E(a)1 and E(D)2 = E(a)2 ⇓′ E(a)2, and by hypothesis
att′(E(a)1, E(a)2) ∈ FC′,P0 , so Property (a) holds. We also have E(D)1 = E(a)1 ⇓ E(a)1 and E(D)2 =
E(a)2 ⇓ E(a)2, so Property (b) holds.
• Case D = x: This case is similar to that for D = diff[a, a].
• Case D = eval h(D1, . . . , Dn): Property (a) follows from the induction hypothesis and Clause (Rf). Next, we
prove the first part of Property (b). The second part of Property (b) follows by symmetry.
Since E(D)1 ⇓′ p1, there exist h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N in def′(h), p1, p1,1, . . . , p1,n, and σ such that
E(Di)1 ⇓′ p1,i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, p1 = σN , and p1,i = σNi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since there exists
no p2 such that E(D)2 ⇓ p2, either for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists no p2,i such that E(Di)2 ⇓ p2,i (and
bad ∈ FC′,P0 by induction hypothesis), or for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists p2,i such that E(Di)2 ⇓ p2,i , and
there exist no h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def(h) and σ such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},   p2,i = σN ′i . Hence,
h must be a destructor.
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By Property S2, there exists an environment E′ such that   E′(a) = E(a) for all a ∈ fn(D),   E′(x) =
E(x) for all x ∈ fv(D), and nfS,(E′). By Lemma 29, att′(E′(a)1, E′(a)2) ∈ FC′,P0 for all a ∈ fn(D) and
att′(E′(x)1, E′(x)2) ∈ FC′,P0 for all x ∈ fv(D). We have nfS,(E′(Di)) and   E′(Di)2 = E(Di)2. By Prop-
erty S2, there existp′2,1, . . . ,p′2,n such that  p′2,i = p2,i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and nfS,(E′, p′2,1, . . . , p′2,n).
By a variant of Lemma 14 for patterns instead of terms, E′(Di)2 ⇓′ p′2,i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
By a variant of Lemma 18 for patterns instead of terms, E′(Di)1 ⇓ p′1,i for some p′1,i such that   p′1,i = p1,i .
By Property S2, there exist p′′1,1, . . . , p′′1,n, p′′1 such that   p′′1,i = p′1,i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},   p′′1 = p1,
and nfS,(E′, p′2,1, . . . , p′2,n, p′′1,1, . . . , p′′1,n, p′′1). By a variant of Lemma 14 for patterns instead of terms,
E′(Di)1 ⇓′ p′′1,i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By induction hypothesis, Property (a), we obtain att′(p′′1,i , p′2,i ) ∈ FC′,P0
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since   p′2,i = p2,i , there exist no σ and h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def(h) such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
  p′2,i = σN ′i . By Lemma 16, there exist no σ and h(N ′1, . . . , N ′n) → N ′ in def′(h) such that for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n},   p′2,i = σN ′i , that is, we have
∧
h(N ′1,... ,N ′n)→N ′ in def′ (h)
nounif((p′2,1, . . . , p′2,n),GVar(N ′1, . . . , N ′n))
Since   p′′1,i = p1,i ,   p′′1 = p1, and nfS,(p′′1,1, . . . , p′′1,n, p′′1), by Lemma 16 and a variant of Lemma 13
for patterns instead of terms, there exist h(N1, . . . , Nn) → N is def′(h) and  such that p′′1,i = σNi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and p′′1 = σN . Hence, by Clause (Rt), bad ∈ FC′,P0 .
2. Typability of P ′0: We prove by induction on the process P , subprocess of P ′0, that, if (a) ρ binds all free names and
variables of P , (b) σ is a closed substitution, (c) RC′,P0 ⊇ [[P ]]ρH , and (d) σH can be derived from RC′,P0 , then
σρ  P .
Again, we detail the case of term evaluations. We suppose that ρ binds all free names and variables of let x =
D in P else Q, σ is a closed substitution, RC′,P0 ⊇ [[let x = D in P else Q]]ρH , and σH is derivable from RC′,P0 .
We show that σρ  let x = D in P else Q. To apply the type rule (Term evaluation), it suffices to show that:
• For all p1, p2 such that σρ(D)1 ⇓′ p1 and σρ(D)2 ⇓′ p2, we have σρ[x → (p1, p2)]  P .
By a variant of Lemma 11 for patterns instead of terms, there existp′1,p′2, σ ′, and σ ′′ such that (ρ(D)1, ρ(D)2) ⇓′
((p′1, p′2), σ ′), p1 = σ ′′p′1, p2 = σ ′′p′2, and σ = σ ′′σ ′ except on the fresh variables introduced in the
computation of (ρ(D)1, ρ(D)2) ⇓′ ((p′1, p′2), σ ′).
Hence σ ′′σ ′H = σH can be derived from RC′,P0 , and [[P ]]((σ ′ρ)[x → (p′1, p′2)])(σ ′H) ⊆[[let x = D in P else Q]]ρH ⊆ RC′,P0 so, by induction hypothesis, σ ′′(σ ′ρ[x → (p′1, p′2)])  P , that is,
σρ[x → (p1, p2)]  P .
• If there exists no p1 such that σρ(D)1 ⇓ p1 and there exists no p2 such that σρ(D)2 ⇓ p2, then σρ  Q.
By Lemma 30, σρ(fails(fst(D)))1 and σρ(fails(snd(D)))2 are true, so σ(H ∧ ρ(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧
ρ(fails(snd(D)))2) can be derived fromRC′,P0 . Moreover [[Q]]ρ(H ∧ ρ(fails(fst(D)))1 ∧ ρ(fails(snd(D)))2) ⊆[[let x = D in P else Q]]ρH ⊆ RC′,P0 so, by induction hypothesis, σρ  Q.• If there exists p1 such that σρ(D)1 ⇓′ p1 and there exists no p2 such that σρ(D)2 ⇓ p2, then bad ∈ FC′,P0 .
By a variant of Lemma 11 for patterns instead of terms, there exist p′1, σ ′, and σ ′′ such that ρ(D)1 ⇓′
(p′1, σ ′), p1 = σ ′′p′1, and σ = σ ′′σ ′ except on the fresh variables introduced in the computation of ρ(D)1 ⇓′
(p′1, σ ′). There exists no p2 such that σ ′′σ ′ρ(D)2 ⇓ p2, so by Lemma 30, σ ′′σ ′ρ(fails(snd(D)))2 holds,
hence σ ′′(σ ′H ∧ σ ′ρ(fails(snd(D)))2) can be derived fromRC′,P0 . Since σ ′H ∧ σ ′ρ(fails(snd(D)))2 → bad ∈[[let x = D in P else Q]]ρH ⊆ RC′,P0 , bad ∈ FC′,P0 .• If there exists no p1 such that σρ(D)1 ⇓ p1 and there exists p2 such that σρ(D)2 ⇓′ p2, then bad ∈ FC′,P0 .
This property follows from the one above by symmetry.
By definition, RC′,P0 ⊇ [[P ′0]]ρ0∅, where ρ0 = {a → (a[ ], a[ ]) | a ∈ fn(P ′0)}. Taking P = P ′0, we obtain E  P ′0
with E = σρ0 = {a → (a[ ], a[ ]) | a ∈ fn(P ′0)}. (This result is similar to [3, Lemma 7.2.2].)
3. Properties of C′[P ′0]: We show that E0  0;C′[P ′0]. In order to prove this result, we show that E0  C′[P ′0] by
induction on C′.
When C′ = [ ], the result follows from Property 2. When C′ = (νa : a[ ])C′′, the result follows by induction
hypothesis and the type rule (Restriction). When C′ = C′′ | Q, the result follows from Property 1 and the type
rule (Parallel).
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4. Substitution lemma: Let E′ = E[x → (E(M)1, E(M)2)]. We show by induction on M ′ that E(M ′{M/x}) =
E′(M ′). We show by induction on P that, if E′  P , then E  P {M/x}. This is similar to [3, Lemma 5.1.1].
5. Subject congruence: If E  ;P and P ≡ P ′, then E  ;P ′. We prove by induction on the derivation of P ≡ P ′
that if E  P and P ≡ P ′, then E  P ′ and Label(P ′) = Label(P ), similarly to [3, Lemma 5.1.2].
6. Subject reduction: If E  ;P and ;P → ′;P ′, then E  ′, P ′. We prove by induction on the derivation of
;P → ′;P ′ that if E  ;P and ;P → ′;P ′, then E  ′, P ′ and Label(′) ∪ Label(P ′) ⊆ Label() ∪
Label(P ), similarly to [3, Lemma 5.1.3].
7. Proof of the second hypothesis of Lemma 2: Assume that
unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡ C1[let y = D in Q else Q′]
and fst(D)⇓′ M1 for some M1. Then 0;C′[P ′0] →∗′,≡ ;C′1[let y = D in Q1 else Q′1] where
delete(C′1[let y = D in Q1 else Q′1]) = C1[let y = D in Q else Q′]. We have E0  0;C′[P ′0], so by subject
reduction and subject congruence, E0  ;C′1[let y = D in Q1 else Q′1]. Since E0  C′1[let y = D in Q1 else Q′1]
has been derived by type rules (Restriction) and (Parallel), there exists an environment E such that E  let y =
D in Q1 else Q′1 and since Label((E0)1) ∪ Label() ∪ Label(C′1[let y = D in Q1 else Q′1]) and Label((E0)2) ∪
Label() ∪ Label(C′1[let y = D in Q1 else Q′1]) contain no duplicates, Label(E1) and Label(E2) contain no
duplicates.
Since fst(D)⇓′ M1, by Property E3, E(D)1 ⇓′ E(M1)1. Since E  let y = D in Q1 else Q′1 has been derived
by type rule (Term evaluation) and bad /∈ FC′,P0 , there exists p2 such that E(D)2 ⇓ p2. So by Property E4, there
exists M2 such that snd(D)⇓ M2, which establishes the second hypothesis of Lemma 2.
8. Proof of the first hypothesis of Lemma 2: Assume that
unevaluated(C[P0]) →∗′,≡ C1[N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).R]
and fst(N) = fst(N ′). As above, there exists an environment E such that E  N〈M〉.Q′ | N ′(x).R′ and E1 and E2
satisfy Properties E1, E2, E3, and E4.
Since E  N〈M〉.Q′ | N ′(x).R′ has been derived by type rules (Parallel), (Output), and (Input), we have
msg′(E(N)1, E(M)1, E(N)2, E(M)2) ∈ FC′,P0 and input′(E(N ′)1, E(N ′)2) ∈ FC′,P0 . Since fst(N) = fst(N ′),
E(N)1 = E(N ′)1. Since bad is not derivable from RC′,P0 , nounif(E(N)2, E(N ′)2) is false—otherwise bad would
be derivable by (Rcom)—so, by definition of nounif,  E(N)2 = E(N ′)2. By Property E1,E2 is injective modulo
 and we obtain   snd(N ′) = snd(N).
The symmetric hypotheses of Lemma 2 follow by symmetry.
To conclude our proof of Theorem 3, we apply Lemma 2 and Corollary 1. 
E. Proof of Theorem 4
E.1. Unification modulo the equational theory
We use the standard convention that, when computing a most general unifier σu of Mi,Ni for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
we always arrange that dom(σu) ∩ fv(im(σu)) = ∅ and dom(σu) ∪ fv(σuM1, σuN1, . . . , σuMn, σuNn) ⊆ ∪i (fv(Mi) ∪
fv(Ni)). (We recall that dom(σ ) = {x | x /= σx}.) Since dom(σu) ∩ fv(im(σu)) = ∅, σu is idempotent.
If σ is a most general unifier of Mi,Ni for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and σ ′ is a most general unifier of σM ′i , σN ′i for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n′} then σ ′σ is a most general unifier of Mi,Ni for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and M ′i , N ′i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n′}.
Lemma 31. If σD ⇓′ (M ′, σ ′) and σ is a most general unifier, then σ ′σ is also a most general unifier, and there
exists M ′′ such that M ′ = σ ′σM ′′.
Proof. The proof is by mutual induction following the definition of ⇓′. All cases are easy. 
Lemma 32. We have   σM = σM ′ if and only if there exist N, N ′, σ ′, and σu such that addeval(M,M ′) ⇓′
((N,N ′), σ ′), σu is the most general unifier of N and N ′, and for all x ∈ fv(M,M ′),   σx = σσuσ ′x.
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Proof. Assume   σM = σM ′. By Property S2, there exist M ′′ and σ ′ such that   M ′′ = σM = σM ′,  
σx = σ ′x for all x ∈ fv(M,M ′), and nfS,({M ′′} ∪ {σ ′x | x ∈ fv(M,M ′)}). Since   σ ′M = σ ′M ′ = M ′′, by
Lemma 12 we have σ ′addeval(M)⇓′ M ′′ and σ ′addeval(M ′)⇓′ M ′′. By Lemma 11, there exist N,N ′, σ1, σ ′1 such
that addeval(M,M ′) ⇓′ ((N,N ′), σ1), M ′′ = σ ′1N , M ′′ = σ ′1N ′, and σ ′ = σ ′1σ1 except on fresh variables introduced
in the computation of addeval(M,M ′) ⇓′ ((N,N ′), σ1).
So N and N ′ unify. Let σu be their most general unifier. Let σ ′′1 such that σ ′1 = σ ′′1 σu. Let x ∈ fv(M,M ′). We
have   σx = σ ′x = σ ′′1 σuσ1x = σ ′′1 σuσ1σuσ1x = σ ′σuσ1x = σσuσ1x. (Indeed, σuσ1 is a most general unifier by
Lemma 31 and the composition of most general unifiers, so it is idempotent.)
Conversely, assume that there exist N,N ′, σ ′σu such that addeval(M,M ′) ⇓′ ((N,N ′), σ ′), σu is the most general
unifier of N and N ′ and for all x ∈ fv(M,M ′),   σx = σσuσ ′x. Then
  σM = σσuσ ′M
= σσuN by Lemma 15
= σσuN ′ since σu is the most general unifier of N and N ′
= σσuσ ′M ′ by Lemma 15 again
= σM ′ 
E.2. Soundness of the solving algorithm
The following proofs are partly adaptations of previous proofs [15,18]. In addition, they establish the soundness of
all simplifications for nounif.
Let R0 = RP0 be the initial set of clauses, R1 =saturate(R0) be the final set of clauses, and R be the set of clauses
during the saturation. At the end of the saturation algorithm, we have R1 = {R ∈ R |sel(R)=∅}.
Lemma 33. At the end of the saturation, R satisfies the following properties:
1. For all R ∈ simplify(R0), there exists R′ ∈ R such that R′  R.
2. Let R ∈ R and R′ ∈ R. Assume that sel(R)=∅ and there exists F0 ∈sel(R′) such that R ◦F0 R′ is defined. In this case,
for all R′′ ∈ simplify(R ◦F0 R′), there exists R′′′ ∈ R such that R′′′  R′′.
Proof. To prove the first property, let R ∈ simplify(R0). We show that during the whole execution of the saturation,
there exists R′ ∈ R such that R′  R.
The algorithm first builds simplify(R0) (which obviously satisfies the required property), then removes subsumed
clauses by condense. The property is preserved by elimination of subsumed clauses. So R = condense(R0) satisfies
the property. Further additions of clauses and eliminations of subsumed clauses preserve the property, so we have the
result.
The second property states that the fixpoint is reached at the end of saturation. 
We now give a precise definition of derivations.
Definition 7 (Derivation). Let Tfacts be the set of true nounif facts. Let R be a set of clauses and F be a closed fact.
A derivation of F from R is a finite tree defined as follows:
1. Nodes (except the root) are labelled by clauses R ∈ R or nounif facts in Tfacts.
2. Edges are labelled by closed facts. (Edges go from a node to each of its sons.)
3. The root has one outgoing edge, labelled by F .
4. If the tree contains a node labelled by R with one incoming edge labelled by F0 and n outgoing edges labelled by
F1, . . . , Fn, then R  {F1, . . . , Fn} → F0. If the tree contains a node labelled by a fact in Tfacts, then this node has
one incoming edge labelled by the same fact and no outgoing edge.
In a derivation, if there is a node labelled by R with one incoming edge labelled by F0 and n outgoing edges labelled
by F1, . . . , Fn, then the clause R can be used to infer F0 from F1, . . . , Fn. Therefore, there exists a derivation of F
from R if and only if F can be inferred from clauses in R.
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The key idea of the proof of the algorithm is the following. Assume that bad is derivable from R0 and consider
a derivation of bad from R0. Assume that the clauses R and R′ are applied one after the other in the derivation of
bad. Also assume that these clauses have been combined by R ◦F0 R′, yielding clause R′′. In this case, we replace
R′ by R′′ in the derivation of bad. When no more replacement can be made, we show that all remaining clauses
have no selected hypothesis. Then all these clauses are in R1 =saturate(R0), and we have built a derivation of
bad from R1. Moreover, this replacement process terminates because the number of nodes of the derivation strictly
decreases.
Lemma 34. Consider a derivation that contains a node η′, labelled R′. Let F0 be a hypothesis of R′. Then there
exists a son η of η′, labelled R, such that the edge from η′ to η is labelled by an instance of F0, R ◦F0 R′ is
defined, and we still have a derivation of the same fact if we replace the nodes η and η′ by a node η′′ labelled R′′ =
R ◦F0 R′.
Proof. This proof is already given in [18], with a figure. Let R′ = H ′ → C′, H ′1 be the multiset of the labels of the
outgoing edges of η′, and C′1 the label of its incoming edge. We have R′  (H ′1 → C′1), then there exists σ such that
σH ′ ⊆ H ′1 and σC′ = C′1. Then there is an outgoing edge of η′ labelled σF0, since σF0 ∈ H ′1. Let η be the node at
the end of this edge, let R = H → C be the label of η. We rename the variables of R so that they are distinct from the
variables of R′. Let H1 be the multiset of the labels of the outgoing edges of η. Then R  (H1 → σF0). By the above
choice of distinct variables, we can then extend σ in such a way that σH ⊆ H1 and σC = σF0.
The edge from η′ to η is labelled σF0, which is an instance of F0. We have σC = σF0, then C and F0 are
unifiable, then R ◦F0 R′ is defined. Let σ ′ be the most general unifier of C and F0, and σ ′′ such that σ = σ ′′σ ′. We
have R ◦F0 R′ = σ ′(H ∪ (H ′ − F0)) → σ ′C′. Moreover, σ ′′σ ′(H ∪ (H ′ − F0)) ⊆ H1 ∪ (H ′1 − σF0) and σ ′′σ ′C′ =
σC′ = C′1. Then R′′ = R ◦F0 R′  (H1 ∪ (H ′1 − σF0)) → C′1. The multiset of labels of outgoing edges of η′′ is
precisely H1 ∪ (H ′1 − σF0) and the label of its incoming edge is C′1, so we have obtained a correct derivation by
replacing η and η′ with η′′. 
Lemma 35. If D is a derivation whose node η is labelled R, then we obtain a derivation D′ of the same fact by
relabelling η with a clause R′ such that R′  R.
Proof. Let H be the multiset of labels of outgoing edges of the considered node η, and C be the label of its incoming
edge. We have R  H → C. By transitivity of , R′  H → C. So we can relabel η with R′. 
We now prove the soundness of each simplification function described in Section 7, and of their composition
simplify.
Lemma 36. Letf range over the simplification functions simpeq, elimvar, elimGVar ◦ swap ◦ unify, elimnouniffalse,
elimdup, elimattx, elimtaut, and simplify.
Let Rt = {(1), (2)} when f ∈ {elimvar, simplify} and Rt = ∅ otherwise.
Let D be a derivation of bad such that nf ′S,(D) with a node η labelled R.
We obtain a derivation D′ of bad by relabelling the node η with some clause R′ ∈ f ({R}) ∪Rt , deleting nodes,
and modifying nodes labelled by a fact in Tfacts.
The set of clauses Rt collects clauses that must be included in the clause set for the transformation to be correct. The
proofs closely follow the intuitions for soundness given in Section 7.
Proof (for simpeq). Since nf ′S,(D), the facts of σR (except nounif facts) are irreducible by S, so a fortiori the
facts of R (except nounif facts) are irreducible by S, hence simpeq({R}) = {R}, which obviously implies the desired
result. 
Proof (for elimvar). Let R = H → C, where H = att′(x, y) ∧ att′(x, y′) ∧ . . . and R′ = R{y/y′}. (The case H =
att′(y, x) ∧ att′(y′, x) ∧ . . . is symmetric.) Let H ′ be the multiset of labels of outgoing edges of η and C′ the label of
its incoming edge. Since D is a derivation, there exists σ such that σH ⊆ H ′, and σC = C′.
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• Assume  σy = σy′. Since we have nf ′S,(D),σy = σy′. ThenσR′ = σR, soD′ obtained fromD by relabelling
η with R′ is a derivation.
• Otherwise,   σy /= σy′ and thus σnounif(y, y′) ∈ Tfacts. Let D′ be obtained by relabelling the node η with the
clause att′(x, y) ∧ att′(x, y′) ∧ nounif(y, y′) → bad (1), adding the son σnounif(y, y′), and returning the subtree
with root η. Since att′(x, y) ∈ H , we have σatt′(x, y) ∈ σH ⊆ H ′, and similarly for att′(x, y′). Thus, D′ is a
derivation of bad. 
Proof (for elimGVar ◦ swap ◦ unify). Let R = H ∧ F → C be the clause modified by elimGVar ◦ swap ◦ unify.
We show that if σF ∈ Tfacts, then elimGVar ◦ swap ◦ unify replaces R with R′ = H ∧ F ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ F ′n → C, and
σF ′1, . . . , σF ′n ∈ Tfacts.
It is easy to infer the lemma from this property. Indeed, let H ′ be the multiset of labels of outgoing edges of η and C′
the label of its incoming edge. Since D is a derivation, there exists σ such that σH ∧ σF ⊆ H ′, and σC = C′. Then
σF is derived by a son of η, so σF ∈ Tfacts. Then by the above property σF ′1, . . . , σF ′n ∈ Tfacts, and D′ obtained from
D by relabelling η with R′ = H ∧ F ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ F ′n → C and replacing σF with σF ′1, . . . , σF ′n as sons of η is also a
derivation.
• We now prove that unify replaces F = nounif(p, p′) with F ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ F ′n such that, if σF ∈ Tfacts, then σF ′1, . . . ,
σF ′n ∈ Tfacts.
By definition of nounif, σF ∈ Tfacts if and only if there exists no closed substitution σ ′ with domain GVar such
that   σ ′σp = σ ′σp′. By Lemma 32,   σ ′σp = σ ′σp′ if and only if there exist N,N ′, σ ′′, σu such that
addeval(p, p′) ⇓′ ((N,N ′), σ ′′), σu is the most general unifier of N and N ′, and for all x ∈ fv(M,M ′),  
σσ ′x = σσ ′σuσ ′′x. The fact F is replaced with F ′1, . . . , F ′n, where F ′j = nounif(pj , p′j ) = nounif((xj1 , . . . , xjkj ),
σuσ
′′(xj1 , . . . , x
j
kj
)) for each σuσ ′′ obtained as above. So   σ ′σp = σ ′σp′ if and only if there exists j ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that   σ ′σpj = σ ′σp′j . So σF ∈ Tfacts if and only if σF ′1, . . . , σF ′n ∈ Tfacts. This equivalence
implies the result.
• Next, we show that swap replaces F = nounif(p1, p2) with F ′ = nounif(p′1, p′2) such that, if σF ∈ Tfacts, then
σF ′ ∈ Tfacts.
We can easily show that for all σ ′ with domain GVar ∪ Var,   σ ′p1 = σ ′p2 if and only if   σ ′p′1 = σ ′p′2.
This equivalence yields the result.
• Finally, we show that elimGVar replaces F = nounif((g, p1, . . . , pn), (p′0, . . . , p′n)) (where g ∈ GVar) with F ′ =
nounif((p1, . . . , pn), (p′1, . . . , p′n)) such that, if σF ∈ Tfacts, then σF ′ ∈ Tfacts.
Assume σF ∈ Tfacts. Then there exists no σ ′ with domain GVar such that   σ ′σ(g, p1, . . . , pn) =
σ ′σ(p′0, . . . , p′n). So there exists no σ ′1 such that   σ ′1σ(p1, . . . , pn) = σ ′1σ(p′1, . . . , p′n). Indeed, if σ ′1 existed,
σ ′ = σ ′1{σp′0/g} would contradict the non-existence of σ ′. (Note that g does not occur elsewhere in F , because F
is obtained after applying unify and swap.) Then σF ′ ∈ Tfacts. 
Proof (for elimnouniffalse). Let F = nounif((), ()). For all σ , σF /∈ Tfacts. So R = H ∧ F → C cannot be the label
of a node in a derivation D. (Hence elimnouniffalse may harmlessly remove R.) 
Proof (for elimdup). The result is obvious: the hypotheses of R′ are included in the hypotheses of R, so R′  R. 
Proof (for elimattx). The result is obvious: the hypotheses of R′ are included in the hypotheses of R, so R′  R. 
Proof (for elimtaut). The result is obvious: we remove η and replace it with one of its subtrees. 
Proof (for simplify). We apply Lemma 36 for every simplification function that defines simplify. 
Theorem 5. If saturate(R0) terminates and there is a derivation D of bad from R0 with nf ′S,(D), then there is a
derivation D′ of bad from saturate(R0) with nf ′S,(D′).
B. Blanchet et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 75 (2008) 3–51 49
The key idea of the proof is to replace clauses as allowed by the previous lemmas. When the replacement terminates,
we can show that all clauses are in saturate(R0). We show the termination using the decrease of the number of nodes
of the derivation not in Tfacts.
Proof. Let us consider a derivation D of bad from R0 such that nf ′S,(D). (The property nf ′S,(D) is preserved
by the transformations of the derivation described below: these transformations do not introduce new non-nounif
intermediately derived facts.)
For each clause R in R0, for each R′′ ∈ simplify(R), there exists a clause R′ in R such that R′  R′′
(Lemma 33, Property 1). Assume that there exists a node labelled R in this derivation. By Lemma 36, we can replace
R with some R′′ ∈ simplify(R) ∪ {(1), (2)}. Clauses (1) and (2) are subsumed by some clause in R, since they are
obtained by simplification from (Rt), resp. (Rt′) for g = equals. So, in all cases, there exists R′ ∈ R such that R′  R′′.
By Lemma 35, we can replace R′′ with R′. Therefore, we can replace nodes labelled by R with nodes labelled by R′.
This way, we obtain a derivation of bad from R.
Next, we build a derivation of bad from R1, where R1 = saturate(R0).
Consider a derivation D of bad from R such that nf ′S,(D). If D contains a node labelled by a clause not in
R1 ∪ Tfacts, we can transform D as follows. Let η′ be a lowest node of D labelled by a clause not in R1 ∪ Tfacts.
Then all sons of η′ are labelled by clauses in R1 ∪ Tfacts. Let R′ be the clause labelling η′. Since R′ /∈ R1 ∪ Tfacts,
sel(R′) /= ∅. Take F0 ∈ sel(R′). By Lemma 34, there exists a son η of η′ labelled R, such that R ◦F0 R′ is defined. Since
all sons of η′ are labelled by clauses in R1 ∪ Tfacts, R ∈ R1 ∪ Tfacts. Moreover, by definition of the selection function,
F0 is not a nounif fact, so R /∈ Tfacts, so R ∈ R1, hence sel(R) = ∅ and R ∈ R. By Lemma 34, we can replace η and η′
with η′′ labelled by R ◦F0 R′. By Lemma 36, we can replace R ◦F0 R′ with some R′′′ ∈ simplify(R ◦F0 R′) ∪ {(1), (2)}.
By Lemma 33, Property 2, for each R′′′ ∈ simplify(R ◦F0 R′), there exists R′′ ∈ R such that R′′  R′′′; as noted above,
this is also true for (1) and (2) so for all R′′′ ∈ simplify(R ◦F0 R′) ∪ {(1), (2)}, there exists R′′ ∈ R such that R′′  R′′′.
By Lemma 35, we can replace R′′′ with R′′, and we obtain a derivation D′ of bad from R, such that nf ′S,(D′) and D′
contains fewer nodes not in Tfacts as D (since the resolution of two clauses removes one node, and simplifications do
not add nodes not in Tfacts).
Since the number of nodes not in Tfacts strictly decreases, this transformation process terminates.
When we cannot perform this transformation any more, all nodes of the derivation are labelled by clauses in
R1 ∪ Tfacts, hence we have obtained a derivation D′ of bad from R1 such that nf ′S,(D′). 
Proof (of Theorem 4). If bad is derivable from RP0 then it is derivable from RP0 by a derivation that satisfies nf ′S,
(by Lemma 3), then it is derivable from saturate(RP0) by a derivation that satisfies nf ′S, (by Theorem 5), then
saturate(RP0) contains a clause of the form H → bad. 
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